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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report sets out the results of responses to 
the Survey of Prepaid Mobile Phone Regulation 
and Registration Policies, issued for completion 
between April and October 2005. The survey 
outcome provides baseline data of the current 
state of regulation for prepaid mobile phones 
across international jurisdictions, principally 
those countries that are members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).
The study was prompted in part by recent 
concerns about “anonymous” prepaid 
customers, following reports of terrorists using 
mobile phones to coordinate their activities and 
to detonate bombs. This is the first known effort 
to systematically gather information about the 
regulation of prepaid mobile phones across a 
range of countries.
The results of the survey are intended to 
contribute to an evidence-based policy 
deliberation on the issue of privacy rights and 
prepaid communications services in Canada and 
elsewhere.
The survey instrument itself was divided into 
several themes and contained questions related 
to each of the following areas:
• The regulation of prepaid mobile service 
or SIM cards in the country.
• Information about identity requirements 
for prepaid mobile phone service in the 
country.
• Background studies and codes of 
practice concerning the regulation and/
or registration of prepaid mobile phones.
• Information about the presence and 
administration of an integrated public 
number database in the country.
Of the 24 countries that responded to the 
survey, nine have regulations that require mobile 
operators to collect customer information for 
prepaid service: Australia, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Japan, Norway, Slovak Republic, South 
Africa and Switzerland.
In all cases, the rationale for a prepaid 
registration requirement was to improve efficiency 
of law enforcement and national security 
activities. In some countries the rationale is 
extended to include support for emergency 
services response and the commercial provision 
of public directory services. In a few cases, 
the requirement was raised in conjunction 
with specialized valued-added services (e.g., 
adult content, child minding); in certain cases, 
prepaid phone regulations are part of a wider 
legislative mandate that requires registration of 
all telephone services.
Australia is the only country known to have 
conducted a public consultation specifically 
about prepaid registration and it is expected that 
this consultation will produce empirical details 
that will continue to support a registration 
requirement. A public consultation on larger 
bodies of legislation that included prepaid 
phone registration has been held in Norway. 
Respondents indicated that there have been 
expert consultations in other countries, including 
Switzerland, Norway, and Japan but background 
studies or statistics pertaining to prepaid were 
not forthcoming.
Fifteen of the 24 countries that responded to 
the survey do not have an identity requirement; 
however, at least six countries considered and 
rejected a prepaid registration policy following 
a consultation process. These countries are 
Canada, Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Poland. The UK respondent 
indicated that the UK government might have 
informally considered and rejected registration.
Various stakeholders in these countries 
have made comments that oppose prepaid 
registration. In Canada there have been 
 2 • Executive Summary
statements issued by the privacy commissioner’s 
office, civil society groups, and mobile operators 
concerning problems with the requirements. 
A memo produced by the Mobile Broadband 
Group in the UK is the most detailed of these 
statements; opposition to the requirement 
includes cost, privacy rights, and effectiveness.
Where the registration of prepaid users is 
mandated, few reports have been published 
that oppose this legislation. However, there is 
evidence to suggest that a number of studies 
produced in Germany include findings that do not 
support prepaid registration, but these appear to 
be part of a wider critique of recent changes in 
legislation on data retention.
There is some documented evidence that 
assesses the capability and willingness of 
operators or regulators to monitor and enforce 
compliance in countries where a registration 
requirement has been introduced. For instance, 
in both Australia and Norway the issue of 
compliance has been a subject of ongoing 
discussion between the regulatory authority and 
industry stakeholders. In Switzerland there is 
an unconfirmed report which indicated that the 
service for unregistered prepaid customers was 
suspended after the deadline. In other countries, 
there is very little information that pertains to 
monitoring and compliance efforts either by 
government or mobile operators.
Regardless of whether or not registration has 
been legislated, there are few known cases 
of mobile operators voluntarily establishing 
prepaid registration as a corporate policy. In a 
number of cases, an incentive program is used 
to encourage prepaid customers to provide their 
personal details, but this is not intended for law 
enforcement or public safety purposes.
In countries where a registration policy is in 
effect, the general data collection requirements 
are specified in the regulations. Ireland is the 
only country where mobile operators developed 
an industry-wide code of practice, independent 
of government legislation. There was no 
information forthcoming from any country about 
an industry code of practice to standardize the 
collection of customer data. One exception to 
this is in Australia, where the telecom industry 
in conjunction with the government has produced 
a technical document for collecting customer 
records for the integrated public number 
database.
There was no information forthcoming to suggest 
that alternative measures to identify prepaid 
users have been considered or used in most 
countries, with the exception of Germany and the 
Netherlands. Respondents from these countries 
indicated that IMSI (International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity)-catcher technology has been 
used. Australia has proposed an alternative 
to its “point of sale” identity verification with a 
“post-sale” electronic registration scheme. In 
Hungary, the prepaid phone’s IMEI (International 
Mobile Equipment Identity) number, in addition 
to the SIM card number and the user’s identity 
are recorded.
Australia is the only country known to have an 
active integrated public number database (IPND) 
system. In other countries, including Germany 
and the Netherlands, it was reported that mobile 
operators must maintain databases of customer 
records for law enforcement, but these are not 
integrated.
Australia has reported problems with prepaid 
phones and low quality customer records in the 
IPND; identity fraud and efficient verification 
remains a major challenge for the IPND in 
Australia. Privacy concerns have been raised in 
Australia about use and disclosure of customer 
data from the IPND despite the implementation 
of a detailed industry code of practice and 
standards to govern the use of the IPND system.
Although no empirical studies were located, the 
Australian regulator has issued opinions about 
the value of the IPND for law enforcement, 
public safety, as well as for child safety and 
for supporting competition in the provision of 
telecoms services (e.g., directory assistance, 
local number portability).
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PART I
Purpose and Objectives
The growth of mobile telephone service in Canada 
and around the world has been phenomenal, 
with much of that growth directly attributable to 
the adoption of prepaid (“pay-as-you-go”) plans. 
Prepaid phones today represent a significant 
and growing percentage of the domestic and 
international mobile phone markets.
While this development has been hailed 
as a marketing success in the provision of 
competitive telephone service, it also has raised 
concerns within the law enforcement community 
about the possible use of “anonymous” prepaid 
mobile phones for criminal or terrorist activities. 
In response, a number of countries have passed 
laws to require mobile carriers to collect personal 
information from their prepaid mobile phone 
customers as a condition of service. Canada has 
not yet introduced such regulations and it is not 
clear that it will do so in the future.
Nevertheless, the possibility of prepaid 
registration ought to be a matter of interest for 
the Office of the Privacy Commissioner because 
the legal and ethical implications of such a 
measure remain uncertain. Moreover, public 
deliberation on both sides of the issue in Canada 
has been encumbered by a lack of information 
about what objectives such a requirement might 
realistically seek to achieve or how it might be 
implemented and enforced.
The purpose of this survey is to address this 
information gap by gathering details on the 
current state of regulation of prepaid mobile 
phones across a comparable range of countries 
in the OECD.
This report presents the results of the survey and 
is intended to contribute to an informed public 
deliberation on the question of privacy rights and 
prepaid communications services in Canada and 
elsewhere.
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200 2004 2005 (Q2)
Aliant Mobility -- -- 78,45 (.7%)
Bell Wireless Alliance ,78,705 (2.6%) ,20,76 (2.8%) ,9,855 (26.9%)
Microcell (Fido) 652,966 (52.4%)  545,9 (42.8%)2 --
Rogers Wireless 759,990 (20.0%) 792,00 (4.%) ,7,900 (2.%)
TELUS Mobility 6,680 (7.8%) 696,00 (7.6%) 728,700 (7.5%)
TOTAL ,20,4 (2.8%) 2,809,6 (8.7%) ,8,600 (2.2%)
Prepaid Mobile Phone Service in Canada
Prepaid mobile phone service in Canada 
represents an important segment of the consumer 
market. Figures collected by the Canadian 
Wireless Telecommunications Association (CWTA) 
show that demand for prepaid service has 
remained consistent since 2002.
 Includes Bell Mobility, NorthernTel Mobility, Télébec 
Mobility and the proportionate share of the Virgin Mobile 
Canada joint venture.
2 Microcell data provided up to Q2 only. Rogers Wireless 
acquired the company in 2004.
Source: Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association
Table 1: Growth of Prepaid Mobile Phones in Canada 2000-2005
Source: Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association
Table 2: Major Canadian Mobile Operators and Prepaid Subscriptions
Total Prepaid Total Post Paid
Q1/00 600,387 2,257,022
Q2/00 749,120 4,161,294
Q3/00 841,104 4,304,069
Q4/00 1,114,509 4,478,218
Q1/01 2,088,080 7,016,283
Q2/01 2,269,507 7,252,858
Q3/01 2,420,617 7,525,548
Q4/01 2,733,386 7,945,174
Q1/02 2,823,745 8,140,228
Q2/02 2,747,401 8,438,421
Q3/02 2,838,943 8,608,604
Q4/02 2,967,203 8,959,662
Q1/03 2,990,850 9,141,775
Q2/03 2,995,515 9,395,186
Q3/03 3,091,055 9,690,518
Q4/03 3,203,341 10,218,234
Q1/04 3,200,458 10,465,723
Q2/04 3,119,964 10,791,057
Q3/04 3,163,815 11,179,618
Q4/04 2,809,161 10,925,035
Q1/05 3,254,400 11,307,400
Q2/05 3,318,600 11,644,800
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As shown in Table , prepaid mobile phones 
account for just over 20 per cent of the total 
mobile phone market in Canada, which translates 
to about .-million individual subscriptions. 
Table 2 provides details of the major wireless 
service providers in Canada, showing total 
number of prepaid subscribers for each, as well 
as the percentage of prepaid in relation to the 
total subscriber base for each carrier.
According to the most recent publicly available 
figures, Bell Wireless Alliance holds the greatest 
percentage of prepaid accounts measured 
against its total subscription base, at 26.9 per 
cent. Rogers Wireless, however, has a larger 
total number of prepaid customers at .-million, 
though this amounted to a smaller percentage of 
its total subscription base. 
Consumer demand for prepaid service is due 
partly to the ease with which it can be purchased 
in combination with its widespread availability 
in retail outlets, grocery stores, gas stations, 
and so forth. Customers with credit problems 
or those otherwise concerned about managing 
monthly costs might consider prepaid an 
affordable means of obtaining telephone service. 
Business owners might choose prepaid phones 
for their employees as a cost management 
strategy or to avoid committing to long-term 
contracts with service providers. Parents might 
wish to purchase prepaid mobile phones for 
their children as a means of staying in touch 
and controlling cost. Others might purchase a 
prepaid phone with the intent of using it only for 
emergencies. A 2002 industry report on prepaid 
wireless in the United States identified a number 
of target customer segments:
• Low-credit customers
• Occasional users wanting to avoid contracts
• Teenagers and young adults
• Certain ethnic groups and immigrants 
• Transient travellers
 Katz, Raul, Riddleberger, Eric, Sarma, Bharat, et al. 
(2002). Prepaid Wireless: the Next Frontier in the U.S. 
Wireless Industry. Booz, Allen, Hamilton Publications.
When acquiring prepaid service customers 
usually purchase a mobile handset bundled with 
airtime credit. Purchase of both the handset and 
additional airtime credit can be done with cash, 
cheque, debit or credit card transaction. Handsets 
and airtime credit vouchers are sold through a 
wide range of distribution channels, with airtime 
credit purchased in blocks of minutes or in cash 
value denominations. In some countries, airtime 
credit can be purchased through automated 
teller machines or by electronic transaction over 
the Internet.
Source: Sasktel Mobility website. http://www.
sasktelmobility.com/productsservices/cellular/
images/prepaid_100_card.jpg
Figure 1: Sasktel Mobility Prepaid Card
When a prepaid phone is used to make calls, 
the service provider debits the airtime credit 
according to time used and the type of call that 
is made (e.g., long distance or local). In most 
cases, prepaid accounts also have an expiry date 
associated with the activation of each airtime 
credit voucher. The expiry date can vary from 0 
days to several months depending on the service 
provider.
In Canada and in other countries mobile operators 
have agreed to accept 9-- dialled emergency 
calls from all mobile phones irrespective of the 
subscriber’s account standing. This agreement 
includes prepaid accounts or otherwise inactive 
prepaid mobile phones (provided of course that 
the phone is in working order).
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Prepaid Mobile Phone Service around the World
Prepaid represents a significant share of the 
global mobile phone market, although this varies 
widely from country to country. Table  shows the 
most recent figures for the OECD region, where 
prepaid service accounts for about 40 per cent 
of the mobile phone market. Topping the OECD 
countries is Mexico, where over 90 of the mobile 
phone market is prepaid. South Korea is at the 
bottom of the ranking with almost no reported 
prepaid service in that country. In the EU, Italy 
tops the ranking at over 90 per cent and Portugal 
follows with prepaid customers making up almost 
80 per cent of the total mobile phone market. 
Finland is the lowest ranked EU country with less 
than five per cent of customers choosing prepaid. 
In the United States, prepaid is less than ten per 
cent of the market, whereas Canada is similar to 
Denmark, with prepaid holding just over 20 per 
cent of total market share.
Looking ahead, industry forecasts suggest that 
the prepaid market will grow to reach some 
.5-billion subscribers by 2009. This translates 
to about 59 per cent of the total global wireless 
market.4 As reported in Baskerville’s Global 
Mobile Prepaid Strategies and Forecasts (200):
• 50 per cent of the world’s mobile phone 
customers now use prepaid, generating 
over one-quarter of the total revenues in the 
global market.
4 Newman, Anthony. (2004, March 6). Prepaid phones to 
reach .5 billion users by 2009. infoSync World. Retrieved 
Apr. , 2004. Available http://www.infosyncworld.com/
system/print.php?id=47
Source: OECD Communications Outlook 2005
Table 3: Prepaid Mobile Phones in the OECD
OECD Communications Outlook 2005 - Table 4.9 Mobile Prepaid Subscriptions
Country 2003 % of Total
Mexico 93.3
Italy 91.2
Portugal 78.7
Hungary 77.5
Czech Republic 74.9
Turkey 74.8
Ireland 73.4
New Zealand 69.7
United Kingdom 67.9
Greece 65.4
Belgium 62.3
Slovak Republic 62.1
Netherlands 61.8
Luxembourg 59
Spain 58.4
Sweden 56.8
Poland 54.4
Germany 51.4
Austria 47.1
Norway 42.5
Switzerland 42
France 41.1
OECD 41
Iceland 40.3
Australia 39.1
Canada 23.8
Denmark 23.5
United States 7.3
Japan 3
Finland 2
Korea 1.8
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Source: Baskerville Global Mobile Prepaid Strategies and Forecasts (2003)
Table 4: Growth of Prepaid Subscribers Globally 2004-2010
• Most markets continue to actively promote 
prepaid service, especially the largest and 
fastest growing markets in China and India.
• Between the end of 2002 and end of 200, 
it is expected that 80 per cent of new 
customers will opt for prepaid services.
• The one-billionth prepaid customer is 
forecasted to take up service in 2005.
• From 2005 and beyond, at least three-
quarters of the total mobile phone market 
base will consist of prepaid users.
• By end of 200 it is forecasted that there 
will be .5-billion prepaid mobile phone 
customers, generating over $240-billion per 
year in revenue.5
Prepaid mobile phones are one category within 
a larger market of “stored value cards” that also 
5 Baskerville (200). Global Mobile Prepaid Strategies and 
Forecasts. Informa Telecoms Group.
include gift cards, travel cards, and payroll cards. 
A 2004 report issued by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia suggests that the overall 
market for stored valued cards will increase in 
the future:
Many merchants, card associations, and 
issuers argue that the prepaid card market 
is on the verge of a major expansion, 
and some are already investing heavily 
in developing new prepaid products. 
Mastercard, for example, estimates 
that prepaid cards have the potential to 
move $0.5 trillion in traditional consumer 
payments and $.5 trillion in other types 
of payments (e.g., business to business, 
government to consumer, etc.).6
6 Furletti, Mark. (2004). Prepaid Card Markets & 
Regulation. Philadelphia: Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia. (p. 9)
Country Prepaid subscribersTotal subscribers
World 122 88
Asia      Pacific 234 142
Africa 204 188
Middle East 195 162
Eastern Europe 109 96
North America 101 62
South America 64 60
Western Europe 5 9
Growth of total and prepaid customer base over the forecast period 2004-2010
World Asia      Pacific Africa Middle East Eastern Europe North America South America Western Europe
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
225
250
Growth of prepaid customerscompared with total growth 2004-2010
Prepaid subscribers Total subscribers
Per
cen
tag
e g
row
th
 2 • Part I — Privacy Rights and Prepaid Mobile Phones
Attempts to regulate a growing “stored value” 
card market could lead to proposals for 
merchants to collect and register customer 
information for other types of prepaid services 
besides prepaid mobile phones, to prevent fraud 
or to address other legal concerns.
Privacy Rights and Prepaid Mobile Phones
Debates about privacy rights and mobile 
phones have so far tended to focus on the 
issue of location privacy, partly in reaction to 
the advent of location-based services and new 
mobile positioning capabilities. For instance, 
a number of critical assessments have been 
made concerning location privacy and FCC’s 
wireless E9-- mandate in the United States 
that requires mobile operators to provide real-
time location data to emergency services when 
their customers dial 9--.7 A central assumption 
made by these studies is that customer data 
has been collected at the point of sale and is 
held by the mobile operator in a database that 
is then accessible to law enforcement agencies 
or commercial location-based service providers. 
Privacy advocates concern themselves with the 
terms and conditions by which this customer 
information might be disclosed to third parties. 
This has been described elsewhere as the “first 
domain” of location privacy research.8
Alternatively, however, there is the case where 
a customer may choose to withhold personal 
data from the mobile operator because it is 
simply not needed to provide service, as in the 
case of prepaid (sometimes called ‘pay-as-you-
go’) plans. In this case, the privacy rights issue 
centres on the terms and conditions by which an 
operator might be required by law to collect and 
7 Regan, Priscilla, Bennett, Colin and Phillips, David. 
(2002, Sept. 28-0). Emergent Locations: Implementing 
Wireless E9-- in Texas, Virgina, and Ontario. Paper 
presented at the Telecommunications Policy Research 
Conference, Alexandria, Virginia.
8 Gow, Gordon A. (2005). Information Privacy and Mobile 
Phones. Convergence, (2), 75-87.
verify personal information from their customers 
at either at the point of sale or when activating 
the service. This issue has not been extensively 
examined in the literature on information privacy, 
perhaps in part because prepaid mobile phone 
service is a new business model. Nevertheless, 
it raises an interesting question for privacy 
studies: should there be an entitlement to 
anonymity in the ownership and use of a 
telephone? This question extends to a wider 
issue that goes beyond “plain old telephone 
service” and considers the ownership and use of 
other networked communication devices, such as 
desktop computers running VoIP applications, IP 
appliances that transmit and receive telematics 
data from a network, and even so-called “smart 
cards” that provide stored value or facilitate other 
forms of network-based transactions. In other 
words, is there a legitimate claim to anonymity 
in the ownership and use of any communication 
technology, much like there is an established 
entitlement to anonymous publication? The intent 
of this study is not to delve into the bigger issue 
per se but rather to provide empirical evidence 
with which to examine the issue as it relates to 
mobile phones, and with the secondary intent of 
contributing to a wider public policy debate on 
the matter.
A debate over prepaid mobile phones and the 
anonymity question surfaced initially in Canada 
during the Wireless E9 proceedings. The 
substance of these proceedings was the design 
and deployment of an “enhanced” emergency 
service for mobile phones. Similar to the initiative 
in the United States, “enhanced” or E9 means 
a system for the provision of real-time location 
information and caller line identification from 
a mobile phone subscriber to the emergency 
services operator handling a 9-- dialed call.
During the Canadian proceedings, one mobile 
operator revealed that a significant proportion 
of its customer base was prepaid and that it 
would not be feasible to provide the kind of 
detailed customer information that some public 
safety organizations were seeking for the E9 
service. The mobile operator stated in its 
remarks to the Canadian regulator that prepaid 
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services are frequently offered through third 
party retailers who are not required to verify 
customer information, and in some cases where 
prepaid phone packages are sold at convenience 
stores, retailers may not even collect customer 
information. The mobile operator argued that 
attempting to fulfil such an obligation for its 
prepaid segment would be onerous undertaking 
of little practical value and, moreover, that it 
might in fact violate provisions of Canada’s 
privacy legislation:
… we submit that is entirely reasonable 
and legitimate for a customer to want to 
limit the disclosure of personal information 
when subscribing to a service, especially 
prepaid service where no monthly bill is 
issued and there is no apparent need for 
a subscriber address. … Microcell [the 
mobile operator] submits that it is by no 
means intuitively obvious to a reasonable 
member of the general public that a fixed 
address must be provided in order to 
receive mobile phone service. Resistance 
to providing fixed address information, 
therefore, is understandable, especially 
in light of the heightened awareness 
of privacy rights and concerns over the 
ability of organizations to protect personal 
data in the information age.9
From the perspective of this mobile operator, the 
collection of customer information in the form 
of a home or business address is considered 
irrelevant to locating a mobile phone customer 
for public safety purposes, and possibly unlawful 
if gathered with respect to prepaid offerings.
In response to this position, certain emergency 
services organizations argued that customers do 
not have a right to anonymity with regard to any 
form of mobile phone service:
9 Microcell Telecommunications Inc. (200, Dec. 
4). CRTC 8669-C2-0/0 - Public Notice 200-0 
- Conditions of service for wireless competitive local 
exchange carriers and for 9-- services offered by wireless 
service providers - Comments - 200/2/4 - Microcell 
Telecommunications Inc. Available http://www.crtc.gc.ca/
PartVII/Eng/200/8669/C2-0.htm
[Mobile operators] would have us believe 
they are now experts in privacy law, and 
their customer’s [sic] have the right to be 
anonymous. How many wireline customers 
have this right, the answer is none.0
Prior to making this statement, the public safety 
agencies had put forward a recommendation 
that all new mobile phone customer activations 
be accompanied by two pieces of photo 
identification as a way of collecting and verifying 
their personal information for entry into the E9-
- system. The mobile operators industry, in 
opposition, characterized this as an action that 
would “establish Canada as a wireless backwater 
compared to other countries’ approach to 
consumer friendly communications,” suggesting 
further that such a requirement “is unjustifiable 
and offensive to personal privacy” when it comes 
to prepaid services.
Further inquiry into this matter has revealed 
that concern about “anonymous” prepaid 
customers has surfaced in other countries, 
especially following reports of terrorists using 
mobile phones to coordinate their activities and 
to detonate bombs. In 2004, for instance, the 
New York Times reported that law enforcement 
authorities had intercepted an al-Qaeda terrorist 
cell using prepaid mobile phones issued by a 
Swiss mobile operator.2 The Madrid bombings in 
0 Alberta E9-- Advisory Association. (2002, Jan. 28). 
CRTC 8669-C2-0/0 - Public Notice 200-0 - Conditions 
of service for wireless competitive local exchange carriers 
and for 9-- services offered by wireless service providers 
- Reply Comments - Phase II - 200/0/28 - Alberta E9--
 Advisory Association. Available http://www.crtc.gc.ca/
PartVII/Eng/200/8669/C2-0.htm
 Microcell Telecommunications Inc. (2002, Jan. 
7). CRTC 8669-C2-0/0 - Public Notice 200-0 
- Conditions of service for wireless competitive local 
exchange carriers and for 9-- services offered by wireless 
service providers - Reply Comments - Phase I - 200/0/7 
- Microcell Telecommunications Inc. Available http://www.
crtc.gc.ca/PartVII/Eng/200/8669/C2-0.htm
2 Swissinfo. (2004, March 4). Swiss phone cards help 
trace al-Qaeda. swissinfo.org. Retrieved Apr. 4, 2004. 
Available http://www.swissinfo.org/sen/Swissinfo.html?site
Sect=&sid=476869 
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2004 were also linked to prepaid mobile phones 
that were allegedly used as detonators.
Earlier, in 2002, Spain tabled a proposal with 
the EU to encourage member states to consider 
developing a set of harmonized regulatory 
requirements for identifying users of prepaid 
card technology. Representatives in this case 
pointed to a 995 European Council Resolution 
on lawful interception of telecommunications and 
claimed that “the lack of regulation of anonymous 
prepaid telephone cards clashes with the need 
for law enforcement agencies to have access to 
telecommunications.”4 While no formal action on 
this proposal has yet been taken at the EU level, it 
is still the case that law enforcement organizations 
do appear deeply concerned about an apparent 
link between anonymous prepaid mobile phones 
and criminal and terrorist activities. The following 
sample of comments illustrate this growing 
concern prepaid mobile phones and crime:
… the Polish Ministry of Infrastructure 
introduced a new obligation for 
mandatory identification of buyers of 
pre-paid GSM-cards. The proposal is 
brought as an anti-terrorism measure. 
—European Digital Rights, EDRI-gram 
(Dec. 2004)
‘Removing the anonymous cards will 
be good for the fight against criminals,’ 
said Police President Jiri Kolar, 
adding that the anonymity of callers 
often frustrated their investigations. 
—Prague Post, 24 Feb 2005
  Al Qaeda reivindica los atentados en un vídeo 
hallado en Madrid. (2004, March 4). elmundo.es. 
Retrieved Apr. 4, 2004. Available http://www.elmundo.es/
elmundo/2004/0//espana/079205.html;
The mystery of Madrid’s prime suspect. (2004, March 22). 
The Australian (article from the Sunday Times). Retrieved Apr. 
4, 2004. Available http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au.
4  van Buuren, Jelle. (2002, May 9). EU wants 
identification system for users of prepaid telephone cards. 
Telepolis. Retrieved Dec. 20, 2004. Available http://www.
heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/2/2574/.html
The “community [now] has confidence 
that crime is not being facilitated through 
anonymous … SIMs. Especially at risk 
are crimes like stalking, harassment, 
threats to interfere with witnesses. Also 
that law enforcement has confidence 
in a database for emergency calls.” 
—Executive from Australia telecom 
industry
There is opposition to such regulatory measures, 
however, particularly by those who question the 
feasibility of a prepaid registration requirement. 
This is a position characterized, or rather satirized, 
by John Lettice, writing for the UK-based mobile 
communications news source The Register:
We at The Reg … [have] had reports from 
all over Europe of how you could easily buy 
international-rated SIM modules for cash, 
no ID, no problem. We got the impression 
that most stores would probably call the 
police if you tried to force your details on 
them, and we were particularly impressed 
by the ease with which you could buy them 
in France, where they’re actually supposed 
to take your details. You can even get 
round this by buying the French ones from 
a certain well-known UK chain; frankly, 
France Telecom’s insistence on your 
filling in a form prior to buying one online 
sits as a splendid example of rectitude, 
isolated in a world of terror-friendly laxity. 
[emphasis in original]
He concludes the piece by referring to the Swiss 
requirement to register prepaid SIM cards (i.e., 
mobile phones) for law enforcement purposes:
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Once they’ve got records on all the cards 
in use, the security procedures will be 
simple. If they’ve caught an Al Qaeda 
terrorist and discovered he’s using a 
Swiss SIM, they can look up the record 
of his address, then go and arrest him. 
No, we’ll try that again. When they notice 
a suspicious pattern of usage, with calls 
being made from suspicious locations 
like Islamabad, Baghdad and Finsbury 
Park, they can look up the address he 
filled in and go and arrest him. No, we’re 
not sure that works either... 5
Lettice, like a number of privacy rights 
advocates and mobile operators, believes that a 
registration requirement is futile in those cases 
for which it is claimed it is most needed. While 
it may be true that prepaid mobile phones are 
a chosen communications device for criminals 
and terrorists, it is not necessarily true that 
registration of prepaid mobile phones will act 
as a deterrent to those who are serious about 
committing criminal or terrorist acts. In fact, the 
evidence, as suggested by anecdotal comments 
received by Lettice from his readers, seems to 
indicate that such a requirement is probably not 
enforceable in any reliable or consistent manner.
Figure 2 shows a political cartoon published 
in Nebelspalter magazine in response to the 
Swiss government decision to ban “anonymous” 
prepaid mobile phones in 2004. The cartoonist 
is suggesting that a registration requirement 
will lead criminals to resort to identity fraud to 
obtain prepaid phones. In the drawing, a hand 
reaches out from a dark alley way, tempting a 
young passerby with cash: “Psst … Kid! I’ll give 
you some money if you buy me a prepaid card 
using your name.”
5  Lettice, John. (200, March 2). Swiss move to 
block al-Qaeda mobile phone supply. The Register. 
Retrieved Apr. 4, 2004. Available http://www.theregister.
co.uk/200/0/2/swiss_move_to_block_al/
 
Source: Cartoon by Silvan Wegmann, published in 
Nebelspalter magazine; http://www.nebelspalter.
ch/magazin/archiv/archiv_2003/04/prepaid.htm
Figure 2: Political cartoon about the Swiss ban 
“anonymous” prepaid phones.
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A Test of Reasonable Appropriateness
One way to frame the question of prepaid 
phones and privacy rights is to consider it in 
light of current privacy legislation. In Canada, 
telecommunications services fall under federal 
government jurisdiction where the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents 
Act (PIPED Act) applies. Section 5 of the PIPED 
Act establishes general terms and conditions 
for the protection of personal information and 
subsection 5. is most interesting for what 
it suggests about the collection of data from 
customers who might be purchasing or ‘topping-
up’ a prepaid mobile phone:
An organization may collect, use or 
disclose personal information only for 
purposes that a reasonable person 
would consider are appropriate in the 
circumstances.6
In other words, the collection of customer 
information by a mobile phone operator is 
subject to a test of reasonable appropriateness 
in Canada. On the one hand, the collection of 
personal information might be lawful under the 
terms of service between a telephone service 
provider and it customers, and indeed, in the 
case of contract billing (so-called ‘postpaid’ 
accounts), the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
has found this to be the case.7 On the other 
hand, however, section 5. might be cited 
to challenge the rightfulness of collecting 
subscriber list information for prepaid mobile 
phone customers.
6  Privacy Commissioner of Canada. (2000). Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. 
Available http://www.privcom.gc.ca/legislation/02_06_0_
0_e.asp
7  Privacy Commissioner of Canada. (200, Nov. 8). 
PIPED Act Case Summary #24: Telephone company demands 
identification from new subscribers. Commissioner’s 
Findings. Available http://www.privcom.gc.ca/cf-dc/cf-dc_
008_e.asp
It does not appear to be the case that the 
Privacy Commissioner has yet been asked to 
give opinion on such a challenge; however, in 
responding to a law enforcement proposal to 
require registration of prepaid phones in Canada, 
the Privacy Commissioner has made its position 
quite clear:
[Requiring customer identity verification] 
raises the spectre of convenience store 
clerks demanding and recording—and 
then transmitting—people’s sensitive 
personal information, such as driver’s 
license and credit card numbers, as a 
condition of purchasing pre-paid phones 
or phone cards. This would be a gross 
invasion of privacy.8
If considered against section 5. of the PIPED 
Act, this “gross invasion of privacy” would stem in 
part from the view that the collection of personal 
information is not needed to provide prepaid 
service and therefore it is neither reasonable nor 
appropriate to require its collection. Nonetheless, 
law enforcement might argue with equal effect 
that registration of prepaid mobile phones is 
indeed “reasonable” and “appropriate” as a 
measure to fight crime and prevent terrorism.
Given this predicament, a test of reasonable 
appropriateness might be settled in one of two 
ways. First, by producing empirical evidence 
to show that a program of registration has 
a deterrent effect on crime and terrorism. 
Such evidence might support registration as a 
“reasonable” and “appropriate.” However, the 
Privacy Commissioner in Canada has stated 
previously that there is no empirical evidence 
to support claims associated with a call for 
prepaid registration in Canada’s Lawful Access 
Consultations in 2002 (Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada, 2002). Moreover, an 
initial investigation conducted for this report was 
unable to identify published studies that either 
8  Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. (2002, 
Nov. 25). Privacy Commissioner’s reply comments regarding 
the “Lawful Access” proposals. Available http://www.
privcom.gc.ca/media/le_0225_e.asp
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establish a clear link between prepaid mobile 
phones and telephone-based criminal/terrorist 
activity, or that establish a link between the 
introduction of a prepaid registration policy and 
a corresponding reduction in telephone-based 
criminal/terrorist activity.
On the other hand, it might not be necessary 
to produce such evidence and still present 
a politically and socially acceptable case for 
adopting a registration policy for prepaid phones. 
Such a case could be based on an interpretation 
of existing legislative authority and/or an 
efficiency argument that claims such regulation 
will improve the efficiency of law enforcement 
and public safety undertakings.9
Source: Vodafone Japan. http://www.vodafone.jp/
english/products/index.html
Figure 3: Notice to Vodafone Japan customers
Critics, however, might present an equally 
compelling argument to suggest that claims 
about the efficiency gains of registration are 
fallacious, and that alternative methods of 
identifying telephone users are more effective. 
For example, this is the position taken in a memo 
drafted by the UK-based Mobile Broadband 
Group where it is argued that a registration 
policy is an expensive strategy of little practical 
effect. This position therefore tends to support 
9  Baldwin, Robert and Cave, Martin. (999). 
Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice. 
New York: Oxford University Press. (p. 77-8).
the claim to “anonymous” ownership and use 
of prepaid mobile phones both on the authority 
of existing privacy legislation and also on an 
efficiency argument (i.e., prepaid registration is 
not an efficient strategy).
One aim of this study is to support an informed 
public deliberation about this notion of 
“reasonable appropriateness” as it pertains 
to a prepaid registration policy in Canada 
and elsewhere. More specifically, the primary 
motivation for the survey has been to generate 
empirical evidence on the regulation of prepaid 
mobile phones in countries similar to Canada.
The importance of having such evidence on 
hand during deliberations is reinforced by the 
potential problem of making improper inferences 
drawn from anecdotal reports in the media and 
elsewhere. For instance, in a widely read book 
on the policy process, Giandomenico Majone 
has noted the persistent and often unexamined 
problem of logical fallacies, or pitfalls that 
sometime pervade analysis:
A pitfall is a conceptual error into which, 
because of its specious plausibility, 
people frequently and easily fall. It is the 
taking of a false logical path that may 
lead the unwary to absurd conclusions. A 
pitfall is for the practical arguments used 
in policy analysis what the logical fallacy 
is in deductive reasoning. In both cases, 
one has to be always on guard against 
hidden mistakes that can completely 
destroy the validity of a conclusion.20
20  Majone, Giandomenico. (989). Evidence, Arguments, 
and Persuasion in the Policy Process. New Haven: Yale 
University Press (p. 52).
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Majone specifies that a pitfall is not a simple 
error in procedure or in factual evidence, but 
instead stems from a more fundamental flaw in 
the basic structure of an argument supporting 
a proposed solution or approach. The intent of 
the study has not been to carry out an in-depth 
analysis of the findings, but rather to present 
a baseline of information to help policymakers 
and others avoid some of the pitfalls that might 
otherwise encumber public debate on the 
question of prepaid communications and privacy 
rights in Canada and elsewhere.
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PART II
Survey Design
The survey was designed to gather information 
related to five primary research questions:
. What is the justification and related 
evidence to support regulatory measures to 
eliminate the sale of ‘anonymous’ prepaid 
mobile phone service in countries similar to 
Canada?
2. What is the justification and related 
evidence to support regulatory measures 
to protect the sale of ‘anonymous’ prepaid 
mobile phone service in countries similar to 
Canada?
. What is the feasibility of implementing and 
enforcing regulatory measures intended to 
eliminate the sale of anonymous prepaid 
mobile phone service in countries similar to 
Canada?
4. If regulatory measures are not feasible then 
what type of alternative measures have 
been or might be adopted to achieve similar 
ends?
5. If anonymous prepaid mobile phones continue 
to be permitted then what impact might this 
have on the accuracy and usefulness of any 
form of integrated public number database, 
either planned or envisaged, in countries 
similar to Canada?
The survey instrument itself was divided into five 
themes and contained questions related to each 
of the following areas:
• Part A: The regulation of prepaid mobile 
service or SIM cards in your country.
• Part B: Information about identity 
requirements for prepaid mobile phone 
service in your country.
• Part C: Background studies and codes of 
practice concerning the regulation and/or 
registration of prepaid mobile phones.
• Part D: Information about the presence 
and administration of an integrated public 
number database in your country.
• Part E: Additional comments and contact 
information.
Responses to the survey have come from a 
diverse range of participants including mobile 
phone operators, academic experts, and 
government officials. In some cases, additional 
information was drawn from material gathered by 
the research team. This material included media 
reports as well as industry and government 
documents.
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General Observations
The following matrices provide a comparison of observations plotted against a series of indicators. These 
indicators formed part of the interpretive structure that was used to analyze responses to the survey 
questions in relation to the research questions. The intent here is to present general observations derived 
from the 26 countries that responded to the survey.
What is the justification and related evidence to support regulatory measures to eliminate the sale of 
‘anonymous’ prepaid mobile phone service in countries similar to Canada?
Indicators Observations
Number of countries that have 
introduced identity requirements 
for prepaid mobile phone service 
(A)
9 countries out of 24 that have responded to the survey have introduced an 
identity requirement for prepaid; one country that did not participate in the 
survey has allegedly introduced a prepaid registration policy (Italy) although 
this is not confirmed.
Public statements concerning the 
need for such requirements (A2)
In all cases, the rationale for a prepaid registration requirement was to improve 
efficiency of law enforcement and national security activities; in some countries 
the rationale is extended to include support for emergency services response 
and the commercial provision of public directory services; in a few cases, the 
requirement was raised in conjunction with specialized valued-added services 
(e.g., adult content, child minding); in certain cases, prepaid phone regulations 
are part a wider legislative mandate that requires registration of all telephone 
services.
Existence of background studies 
or statistics that support such 
requirements (A, B)
Australia is the only country known to have conducted public consultations 
specifically about prepaid registration; it is expected that this consultation 
will produce empirical details that will continue to support a registration 
requirement; a public consultation on larger bodies of legislation that included 
prepaid phone registration has been held in Norway; respondents indicated that 
there have been expert consultations in other countries, including Switzerland, 
Norway, and Japan but background studies or statistics pertaining to prepaid 
were not forthcoming.
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What is the justification and related evidence to support regulatory measures to protect the sale of 
‘anonymous’ prepaid mobile phone service in countries similar to Canada?
Indicators Observations
Number of countries that continue 
to permit the sale and use of 
anonymous prepaid mobile phones 
service (A)
5 of the 24 countries that responded to the survey do not have an identity 
requirement; however, at least 6 countries considered and rejected a prepaid 
registration policy following a consultation process; these countries are 
Canada, Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Poland; the UK 
respondent indicated that the UK government might have informally considered 
and rejected registration.
Public statements concerning the 
problem with such requirements 
(A2)
In Canada there have been statements issued by the Privacy Commissioner’s 
office, civil society groups, and mobile operators concerning problems with the 
requirements; of the countries responding to the survey, a memo produced by 
the Mobile Broadband Group in the UK is the most detailed statement opposing 
registration requirements; opposition to the requirement includes cost, privacy 
rights, and effectiveness.
Existence of background studies or 
statistics that do not support such 
requirements (A, C)
There is evidence to suggest that a number of studies produced in Germany 
include findings that do not support prepaid registration, but these appear to 
be part of a wider critique of recent changes in legislation on data retention.
What is the feasibility of implementing and enforcing regulatory measures intended to eliminate the sale 
of anonymous prepaid mobile phone service in countries similar to Canada?
Indicators Observations
Evidence of capability and 
willingness of designated 
organizations to monitor and 
enforce compliance (B2, B, B4, 
B5)
There is some documented evidence to assess the capability and willingness of 
operators or regulators to monitor and enforce compliance in countries where 
a registration requirement has been introduced; for instance, in both Australia 
and Norway the issue of compliance has been a subject of ongoing discussion 
between the regulatory authority and industry stakeholders; in Switzerland 
there is an unconfirmed report indicated that the service for unregistered 
prepaid customers was suspended after the deadline; in other countries there 
is little available information pertaining to monitoring and compliance efforts 
either by government or mobile operators.
Existence of voluntary corporate 
policy for collecting customer 
information (C2)
There are few known cases where a mobile operator requires prepaid 
registration as a corporate policy (in contrast to it being a regulatory 
requirement); In a number of cases, an incentive program is used to encourage 
prepaid customers to provide their personal details, but this is not intended for 
law enforcement or public safety purposes.
Existence of industry voluntary 
code of practice related to 
collection of customer information 
(C)
In countries where a registration policy is in effect, the general data collection 
requirements are specified in the regulations; Ireland is the only country where 
mobile operators developed an industry-wide code of practice, independent 
of government legislation; there was no information forthcoming from any 
country about an industry code of practice to standardize the collection of 
customer data; one exception to this is in Australia, where the telecom industry 
in conjunction with the government has produced a technical document for 
collecting customer records for the integrated public number database.
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If regulatory measures are not feasible then what type of alternative measures have been or might be 
adopted to achieve similar ends?
Indicators Observations
Potential use of alternative 
methods to identify prepaid mobile 
customers (A4)
There was no information forthcoming to suggest that alternative measures 
to identify prepaid users have been considered or used in most countries, 
with the exception of Germany and the Netherlands; respondents from these 
countries indicated that IMSI-catcher technology has been used; the UK 
respondent mentioned specialized databases for tracking stolen mobile phone 
equipment; Australia has proposed an alternative to its “point of sale” identity 
verification with a “post-sale” electronic registration scheme; In Hungary, the 
prepaid phone’s IMEI number, in addition to the SIM card number and user’s 
identity are recorded.
Documented use of technical 
methods to identify prepaid mobile 
phone customers (A5)
German respondent provided source details for documented evidence of 
IMSI-catcher technology being used in that country to identify mobile phone 
customers.
If anonymous prepaid mobile phones continue to be permitted then what impact might this have on the 
accuracy and usefulness of any form of integrated public number database, either planned or envisaged, 
in countries similar to Canada?
Indicators Observations
Size of the prepaid market in the 
country
There is no correspondence with the extent of the prepaid market in a country 
and the existence of an IPND system.
Existence of IPND in a country (D) Australia is the only country known to have an active IPND system; in other 
countries, including Germany and the Netherlands, it was reported that mobile 
operators must maintain databases of customer records for law enforcement, 
but these are not integrated.
Reported experience with an IPND 
in a country (D2)
Australia has reported problems with prepaid phones and low quality customer 
records in the IPND; identity fraud and efficient verification remains a major 
challenge for the IPND in Australia; privacy concerns have been raised in 
Australia about use and disclosure of customer data from the IPND; Australia 
has developed an industry code of practice and standards to govern the use of 
the IPND system.
Statements about prospective 
usefulness of an IPND in a country 
(D, D4)
No empirical studies were located, but the Australian regulator has issued 
opinions about the value of the IPND for law enforcement, public safety, as well 
as for child safety and for supporting competition in the provision of telecoms 
services (e.g., directory assistance, local number portability).
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Individual Country Profiles
The following section provides detailed 
information on each country that was asked to 
respond to the survey. The table accompanying 
each profile includes the most recent OECD 
statistics on prepaid mobile phone service in 
that country, showing the number of subscribers 
and percentage share of the total mobile phone 
market. The arrows indicate the net change in 
the prepaid market from 2002 to 200.
Australia (AU)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
3,339 (30%) 3,339 (26.6%) Í 5,606 (39.1%) È
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook.
The government of Australia requires telecom 
service providers to collect and retain customer 
information for all types of subscriptions including 
prepaid mobile phone service. This requirement 
was first introduced in 997 and subsequently 
amended in 2000 to become Telecommunications 
(Service Provider—Identity Checks for Pre-paid 
Public Mobile Telecommunications Services) 
Determination 2000. Two further amendments 
to the Determination were adopted in 2004 to 
provide mobile operators with flexible identity 
collection procedures.
The prepaid registration requirement is 
enacted as a “Determination” by the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), 
which stems from a provision in the Australian 
Telecommunications Act Section 99() that 
permits the regulator to establish specific 
obligations of mobile operators, referred to 
as “Carriage Service Providers” (CSPs) in the 
legislation.
Other sections of the Telecommunications Act 
relevant to the prepaid policy include Part 4, 
which requires mobile operators to provide 
assistance to law enforcement and national 
security agencies. As such, “a vital part of each 
[carrier’s] preparations to assist law enforcement 
agencies is to maintain accurate records of their 
customer’s personal details.” Part 4 of Schedule 
2 of the Act stipulates that all mobile operators 
contribute to the maintenance of a national 
Integrated Public Number Database, which 
means collecting and validating basic personal 
information for all customers, including prepaid 
subscribers. Further to this obligation, the ACMA 
Telecommunications (Emergency Call Service) 
Determination 2000 requires mobile operators 
to ensure the validity of all customer records 
provided to the IPND administrator to support 
emergency call service.2
In February 2005, the ACMA initiated a review 
of its prepaid policy, leading to a discussion 
paper in July and culminating in a public 
consultation planned for September 2005. The 
review has been launched to address a number 
of shortcomings with the current registration 
requirement; namely, a concern with improving 
the accuracy of end-user information that is 
collected by mobile operators, balanced against 
the constraints imposed by a wide (and growing) 
range of distribution channels for prepaid mobile 
phones.
In the July discussion paper, the ACMA explains 
the policy objective of the prepaid regulations:
… the key objective of the Determination 
is to ensure the collection and 
maintenance of accurate identity data for 
consumers of prepaid mobile services 
in order to provide accurate information 
about consumers of prepaid services 
in order to assist law enforcement 
and national security agencies in their 
investigations, emergency service 
organisations in their responses to 
emergency situations and public number 
2  Australian Communications and Media Authority. 
(2005, July). Identity Checks for Pre-paid Mobile Services: 
Options for improvements to the collection and verification 
of identity information for prepaid mobile phone users. 
Melbourne. (p. 0)
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directory producers in their production of 
useful directories.22
The central purpose of the review has been to 
seek consensus on a further amendment to the 
Determination. This amendment would provide 
for an alternative identification process that 
does not depend on the collection of personal 
information at the point of sale, also known as 
the “Part ” method. The original Determination 
requires that mobile operators collect and verify 
prepaid customer information at the point-of-
sale for all purchases made other than by credit 
or debit card. Verification is performed with a 
document such as a passport or birth certificate 
that is to be examined and confirmed by a retail 
sales agent.2
In 2004 the original Determination was replaced 
with an amendment that retained the “Part 
” method but also included an alternative 
“Part 4” method for the identity check. This 
alternative method allows mobile operators to 
verify customer identification using a database 
maintained by the mobile operator or another 
party. In effect, it provides for an online or 
telephone-based verification procedure that does 
not necessitate a physical examination of the 
identifying documents at the point-of-sale and 
can therefore be done “post-sale.” However, as 
the ACMA has noted, the Part 4 method has yet 
to be widely adopted by the mobile industry in 
Australia:
Implementation of the Part 4 process 
was focussed on obtaining access to a 
robust, single data source against which 
22  ibid. (p. 2)
2  The ACMA discussion paper makes an important 
distinction between validation and verification of documents. 
Identity validation refers to a procedure to check that the 
information provided may be true. For example, to validate 
a customer’s claim that they reside at “45 Hornby Street, 
Vancouver” means to check if there is a “Hornby Street” 
in Vancouver and to check if there is a building with the 
number “45.” Validation of customer details is routine 
procedure for entry into the E9 databases in Canadian 
cities. Verification, on the other hand, is a procedure to 
check that the information provided is true; in other words, 
that the customer is in fact who they profess to be and that 
they do in fact reside at the address given.
carriers and CSPs could verify customer 
data post-sale. Access to a single data 
source was not forthcoming. As a result, 
CSPs continued to use the Part , point 
of sale, identity verification process.24
In May 2004, the ACMA once again amended 
the Determination to allow mobile operators to 
seek approval of any alternative compliance plan 
to qualify as a “Part 4A” method. No such plans 
have so far been approved by the ACMA. In sum, 
the Determination provides three alternative 
procedures for identifying prepaid customers but 
industry continues to operate using the original 
Part  method.
The current review of the Determination has been 
prompted by the ACMA’s recognition of a number 
of concerns. These concerns are noted in the 
July 2005 discussion paper.25
• Compliance in distribution networks: ACMA 
jurisdiction extends to mobile operators but 
not to the retail dealers and agents that 
often sell prepaid services to consumers. 
The ACMA notes that existing contractual 
arrangements between mobile operators 
and their dealers “are not always effective in 
securing compliance with the requirements 
under the Determination.”
• Quality of data collected: the current 
Determination Part  method often leads 
to a duplication of information collection, 
once at the point of sale and again during 
the service activation procedure as required 
by law for the maintenance of the Integrated 
Public Number Database (IPND). Whereas 
verification is required at the point of sale it 
is not required during the activation process, 
leading to a problem of unverified data being 
included in the IPND. The ACMA has noted 
several concerns arising from this situation; 
namely, that the two step procedure is an 
inefficient business practice and that “it 
invites evasion by those seeking to remain 
anonymous for criminal purposes.”
24  ibid. (p. )
25  ibid. (p. -5)
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• IPND accuracy: recent audits of the IPND 
in Australia have revealed low accuracy of 
mobile service records compared with fixed 
line service. In addition, reports to the ACMA 
indicate that the quality of prepaid customer 
records in the IPND is “significantly poorer” 
than that for post-paid mobile phone 
customer records. This has led the ACMA to 
conclude that adequate identity checks are 
not being performed during prepaid mobile 
service activation.
• Industry costs: the ACMA recognizes that 
significant costs are incurred to ensure 
compliance with the Part  method. Costs 
include the provision of training and 
administration of the identity checking 
process at the retail level; the hiring of 
agents to monitor compliance among 
retailers; enforcing compliance; and archiving 
identity documents. The point of sale method 
also leads to missed revenue opportunities 
because it inhibits the mobile industry from 
attempting to distribute prepaid by innovative 
means, such as through vending machines.
• Consumer privacy: the current Part  method 
raises privacy concerns because it often 
means that customers must provide personal 
details and documents in a retail environment 
“in which they may not have confidence that 
their privacy and identity information will 
be safeguarded.” Furthermore, the IPND 
obligation means that customers often must 
submit their details again during the service 
activation procedure.
• Public safety: the current Part  method 
does not require mobile operators to verify 
customer information during the service 
activation process. It is the information 
collected during the activation process 
that is provided to the IPND, which is used 
for both law enforcement and emergency 
services dispatch. Inaccuracies in the IPND 
can in turn create delays in emergency 
services operations during life-threatening or 
time critical situations.
To address these concerns, the ACMA has 
proposed in its discussion paper a long-term 
solution that would eliminate the point of sale 
identity check altogether. Instead, the Part 4 
method would remain but in an expanded form, 
with the ACMA to consider a range of options for 
electronic “point of activation” identity checks 
for mobile operators. The renewed interest in the 
Part 4 method seems to have been prompted by 
“advances in data matching systems” to combat 
identity fraud, including Australian government 
initiative to develop a national “online document 
verification system” (DVS).
The ACMA proposes a method by which mobile 
operators would have access to either a 
government or industry data matching system 
for real-time verification of customer identity 
documents. While the ACMA estimates that its 
proposal is subject to many practical constraints 
and would be at least two years away from 
realization in any form, it also suggests that it 
might be an acceptable strategy for dealing 
with concerns stemming from the current Part  
method:
Preliminary consultation undertaken to 
date with key stakeholders indicates 
strong multi-lateral support for utilising 
the [Document Verification System] to 
provide for a real-time, online identity 
verification process undertaken at point 
of activation of a prepaid service, as 
long as adequate fallback processes are 
in place for activating services where 
the electronic system cannot be used to 
identify a prepaid user.26
Prior to becoming the ACMA, the Australian 
Communications Authority (ACA) published 
annual reports that include a brief section on the 
prepaid Determination and this can be expected 
to continue into the future. In addition, the ACA’s 
Law Enforcement Advisory Committee prepared 
a report in 2002-0 on the topic of identity fraud 
and prepaid phones for the government’s Joint 
Standing Committee on Electoral Matters.27
26  ibid. (p. 22)
27  This is reported in the ACA Annual Report 2002-0 (p. 
65).
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To assist mobile operators and consumers to 
interpret the prepaid Determination, the ACMA 
has published explanatory statements on its 
website. These statements serve in place of an 
industry-wide code of practice for the collection 
of personal information from prepaid customers. 
The explanatory statement for mobile operators 
provides detailed instructions on identity 
collection requirements for a range of scenarios, 
for both Part  and Part 4 methods.28 
Australia maintains a national Integrated Public 
Number Database (IPND) for emergency service 
and law enforcement purposes. It is also a 
shared resource for public number directories 
and directory assistance services. The IPND 
contains all listed and unlisted telephone 
numbers in Australia including fixed line, mobile 
and satellite services as specified in Part 4 of 
Schedule 2 in the Telecommunications Act 1997. 
Incumbent operator Telstra is responsible for 
administering the IPND.
Mobile operators are required to submit details 
of all prepaid customers to the IPND. It is 
industry practice to submit details provided 
during the post sale activation process rather 
than information collected at point of sale. As 
noted above, this can in some instances lead to 
errors and is partly responsible for the relatively 
low quality of prepaid mobile service records in 
the IPND.
The regulatory authority’s Annual Report contains 
a section on the IPND, which provides an update 
on issues and developments associated with it. In 
the 2002-0 report, for instance, the ACA noted 
that it had issued a formal warning to a “public 
number directory producer” for contravention 
of the industry guidelines pertaining to the use 
28  Australian Communications and Media Authority. 
(no date). Buying a pre-paid mobile phone service? 
Available http://www.acma.gov.au/ACMAINTER.2490560:
STANDARD::pc=PC_899; Australian Communications 
and Media Authority. (no date). Explanatory Statement 
to the Telecommunications (Service Provider - Identity 
Checks for Pre-paid Mobile Telecommunications Service) 
Determination 2000. Available http://www.acma.gov.au/
ACMAINTER.2490560:STANDARD::pc=PC_0#Outline.
of the IPND. The ACA’s Performance Report for 
2002-0 indicated that the IPND contained 
nearly 50-million records in 2002, with 2 
telecommunications companies providing data to 
it and four authorized commercial users drawing 
data from it. Commercial data users provide 
“location dependent carriage services” as well 
as public directory services.29
The data contained within the IPND may only 
be accessed for the purposes specified in 
clause 0 () of the Carrier Licence Conditions 
Declaration 1997, which pertains to Telstra’s role 
as database administrator:
… the licensee must establish and 
maintain an industry-wide integrated 
public number database to provide 
information for purposes connected with 
the following activities: 
•  providing directory assistance services;
•  providing operator services or operator 
assistance services;
•  publishing public number directories; 
•  providing location dependent carriage 
services;
•  the operation of emergency call service 
or assisting emergency services … ; 
•  assisting enforcement agencies or 
safeguarding national security … and 
•  any other activities specified by the ACA 
by written notice to the licensee.
In May 200, a private firm was contracted to 
undertake an audit of the IPND to determine the 
accuracy of the data and to assess the procedures 
and processes associated with the provision of 
customer records. Findings reported in July 200 
indicated an unacceptable level of errors in the 
IPND and subsequently prompted the regulatory 
authority to encourage data providers to improve 
the quality of records by issuing “report cards” to 
them. The audit program is to continue annually 
to 2006.
29  Australian Communications Authority. (200). 
Telecommunications Performance Report 2002-0. (p. 
87).
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The IPND is managed according to a detailed 
set of technical and procedural standards 
developed and reviewed by the Australian 
Communications Industry Forum (ACIF) Working 
Group. Among these standards is the document 
titled Industry Code ACIF C555:2000 Integrated 
Public Number Database (IPND) Data Provider; 
Data User and IPND Manager, which provides 
formal specifications on all matters related to 
the maintenance of the IPND.
In March 2005, the Australian Privacy 
Commissioner as part of a wider review process, 
investigated a number of allegations made 
against telecommunications providers under 
section 40 (2) of the Privacy Act 1988 concerning 
the use and disclosure of unlisted numbers in 
the IPND. The review of the Privacy Act included 
consultations from industry, consumer and 
privacy groups, charitable organizations and 
business. The outcome of this review included 
recommendations to amend both the Privacy 
Act and Telecommunications Act to specify the 
use and disclosure of phone numbers, to include 
small businesses in privacy legislation, and to 
clarify Part  of the Telecommunications Act.0 
The ACMA also conducted a consultation in 
summer 2005 to address perceived problems 
with the current ACIF code governing the IPND. 
The ACMA is now considering submissions 
and working with the Telecommunications 
Industry Ombudsman, the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner and the Consumer Commission 
to finalize a new industry standard to regulate 
the use and disclosure of customer data in the 
IPND.
0  Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Australia. (2005, 
March). Getting in on the Act: The Review of the Private 
Sector Provisions of the Privacy Act 988. Retrieved October 
, 2005 from http://www.privacy.gov.au/act/review/
revreport.pdf.
  Australian Communications and Media Authority. 
(2005). Who’s got your number? Regulating the Use of 
Telecommunications Customer Information. Available http://
www.acma.gov.au/ACMAINTER.2490560:::pc=PC_2527.
Austria (AT)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
3,330 (50.9%) 3,259 (48.4%) Í 3,338 (47.1%) Í
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook.
A survey response was not received for Austria 
but informal correspondence indicated that the 
government of Austria does not require mobile 
operators to collect customer information when 
activating prepaid accounts.
Some operators are reported to offer incentives to 
provide personal details for marketing purposes. 
One new entrant in the country is also reported to 
be selling prepaid cards “entirely anonymously” in 
the discount supermarket chain Hofer/Aldi.
Belgium (BE)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
5,154 (67.0%) 5,331 (65.5%) Í 5,429 (62.3%) Í
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook.
The government of Belgium does not require 
mobile operators to collect customer information 
when activating prepaid service accounts. The 
government has neither issued a public statement 
nor sought expert or public opinion on this matter.
The respondent was not able to provide 
information on any background studies that 
might support or oppose identity requirement for 
prepaid service in Belgium.
Mobile phone operators do not publish a code of 
practice for collecting customer information from 
prepaid account holders.
Belgium does not have an Integrated Public 
Number Database (IPND) for the express purpose 
of public safety or law enforcement.
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Canada (CA)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
2,736 (25.7%) 2,937 (24.7%) Í 3,147 (23.8%) Í
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of Canada does not require 
mobile phone operators to collect customer 
information when activating prepaid service 
accounts. There has, however, been some 
pressure exerted by law enforcement to 
introduce a registration policy. In April 200 the 
government published a summary of submissions 
in response to a Lawful Access consultation, 
which indicate that law enforcement agencies 
have called for a prepaid registration policy in 
Canada:
Pre-paid/pay-as-you-go cellphones, 
Internet access cards, Internet cafes 
and Internet facilities at public libraries 
all pose an obstacle to law enforcement 
agencies because the identity of the 
service user is easy to conceal from law 
enforcement.
In keeping with the principle that no 
intercept safe havens be created, 
regulatory obligations should be 
established in Canada requiring the 
identification of users of prepaid 
communications services and the 
maintenance of an accurate subscriber 
database by the service provider.2
There do not appear to be any background 
studies to support or oppose prepaid registration 
in Canada but civil society groups have opposed 
it on principle as a privacy rights issue:
[Communications Service Providers] 
should not be obliged to collect 
2  Nevis Consulting Group. (200, April 28). Summary of 
Submissions to the Lawful Access Consultation. Department 
of Justice Canada, 2004. (p. 8). Available http://www.
canada.justice.gc.ca/en/cons/la_al/ 
subscriber information that they do not 
already collect in the normal course of 
their business. This proposed obligation 
would likely impact most service 
providers and retailers selling prepaid 
and other anonymous telephone cards 
and phones. As noted by the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada, this would be 
a gross invasion of privacy and present 
significant opportunities for data leakage 
or loss (and subsequent threats, such as 
identity theft).
For its part, the Canadian Wireless 
Telecommunications Industry Association also 
opposed a registration policy on the grounds 
that it “might cause the elimination of certain 
services, or class of services, such as prepaid 
wireless.” The CWTA underscored this point 
by pointing to the incongruence of an identity 
requirement for prepaid service:
… [a] problem is created with respect 
to prepaid wireless services provided by 
wireless carriers since valid customer 
information is not required by carriers in 
order to provide prepaid services. Given 
that a credit check is not required, and 
that the customer will never receive 
a monthly bill, there is no need for the 
carrier to request the customer’s name 
or address. The entire transaction of 
activating the customer’s account can 
be conducted over the phone and absent 
any identification. Although wireless 
carriers are increasingly requesting 
customer name and address information 
for business purposes, this information 
is not validated, nor do carriers deny 
service if the customer does not provide 
this information.4
  ibid. (p. 4)
4  Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association. 
(2002, Dec. 6). Lawful Access Consultations: Response 
of the Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association. 
(par. 7). Available http://www.cwta.ca/CWTASite/english/
otherfederal.html# 
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Canada does not have an integrated public 
number database (IPND) for the purpose of 
law enforcement or public safety. During the 
Lawful Access Consultation the idea of an IPND 
being developed for Canada was introduced, to 
which the Privacy Commissioner responded in 
opposition, criticizing the consultation paper of 
treating privacy too lightly on this matter:
The paper suggests that it might 
be appropriate to create a national 
database containing the customer 
name and address and service provider 
information for all Canadian telephone 
subscribers—as recommended by 
the Canadian Association of Chiefs of 
Police.
I cannot support the creation of such 
a database. Yes, it would make it 
easier for law enforcement/national 
security agencies to obtain customer 
name and address and service provider 
information, but the difficulties involved 
in obtaining this information can hardly 
be insurmountable. Furthermore, these 
difficulties serve a purpose—they force 
law enforcement/national security 
agencies to think twice before seeking 
to obtain this information.
The consultation paper appears to 
endorse a view that the name and 
address of an individual with a given 
telephone number carries such a low 
expectation of privacy that access to it 
by law enforcement authorities should be 
a routine procedural matter. I take issue 
with any assertion that one’s name and 
when associated with a unique identifier 
like a telephone number, is somehow 
unworthy of privacy protection.5
5  Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. (2002, 
Nov. 25). Privacy Commissioner’s reply comments regarding 
the “Lawful Access” proposals. Retrieved Apr. 9, 2004. 
Available http://www.privcom.gc.ca/media/le_0225_
e.asp 
It is unlikely that a prepaid registration 
requirement will be introduced in Canada as 
a result of this consultation; however, final 
determinations stemming from the Lawful Access 
Consultation remain uncertain.6
Czech Republic (CZ)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
3,016 (43.4%) 6,731 (78.2%) È 7,268 (74.9%) Í
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of the Czech Republic does 
not require mobile phone operators to collect 
customer information when activating prepaid 
service accounts. However, the respondent has 
indicated that the government did discuss the 
issue in parliament in May 2005. The Prague Post 
newspaper reported on February 24, 2005 that 
the government’s Chamber of Deputies Security 
Committee appealed to cabinet on January 27, 
2005 to draft a law “to ban anonymous SIM 
cards.” It appears that this proposal was not put 
into effect.
A number of government spokespersons are 
quoted in the Prague Post article, including a 
Security Committee member who stated that 
“Should a ban come into force, as it has in 
Germany, Italy, or Great Britain, there would be 
less need for police wiretapping.” This comment 
suggests that proponents of the measure see it 
as an aid to law enforcement but that they might 
not have been well briefed on its implementation 
in other countries given that Great Britain has 
never implemented prepaid regulations.
6  On November 5, 2005 The Modernization of 
Investigative Techniques Act (MITA) was introduced in 
the Canadian Parliament. This bill (C-74) is concerned 
with the retention, use and disclosure of subscriber 
information as it pertains to lawful interception of 
telecommunications. In its present form it does not 
require mobile operators to register prepaid customers. 
See: http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/media/nr/2005/
nr20055-en.asp .
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The respondent was not aware of any formal 
study undertaken in the Czech Republic that 
might support or oppose a prepaid registration 
policy, although discussions were held at one 
time between the regulatory authority and 
the Association of Mobile Network Operators 
to consider the costs/benefits of prepaid 
registration. The respondent did not indicate 
any documentation associated with these 
discussions. Similarly, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the government has considered 
alternative means for identifying prepaid 
customers.
Mobile phone operators do publish corporate 
policies regarding collection of customer 
identification as part of their general terms 
and conditions of service. The collection of 
information from prepaid customers is voluntary 
and at present operators are not seeking to make 
this a mandatory condition of service provision.
The Czech Republic does not have an Integrated 
Public Number Database (IPND) for the express 
purpose of public safety and law enforcement. 
The incumbent operator (Cesky Telecom) is, 
however, obligated as the Universal Service 
Provider in that country to maintain and publish 
a public directory of telephone numbers for 
directory assistance purposes. This public 
directory only contains mobile phone numbers 
of subscribers who have requested their 
publication.
Denmark (DK)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
1,474 (37.2%) 1,354 (30.2%) Í 1,118 (23.5%) Í
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of Denmark does not require 
mobile phone operators to collect customer 
information when activating prepaid service 
accounts. The government has neither issued 
a public statement nor sought expert or public 
opinion on this matter.
The respondent was not able to provide 
information on any background studies that 
might support or oppose identity requirement for 
prepaid service in Denmark.
The respondent was not able to indicate if mobile 
phone operators publish a code of practice for 
collecting customer information from prepaid 
account holders.
Denmark does not have an Integrated Public 
Number Database (IPND) for the express purpose 
of public safety or law enforcement.
Finland (FI)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
83 (2.0%) 90 (2.0%) ¬¬ 94 (2.0%) ¬¬
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
Information was not received for Finland.
France (FR)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
18,061 (48.8%) 17,108 (44.3%) Í 17,146 (41.1%) Í
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of France requires mobile phone 
operators to collect information from customers 
when activating prepaid accounts. The Director 
of Post and Telecommunications, within the 
Interior Ministry, issued a letter to all mobile 
operators in 997 requesting them to collect 
and retain information about prepaid customers. 
The respondent indicated that this letter and 
request were intended to ensure that prepaid 
services would fulfil obligations “of the law of 
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th of July 99 about correspondence secrecy 
and interceptions.”
It is not known if the government of France 
sought and/or received expert or public opinion 
concerning identity requirements for prepaid 
service in conjunction with this letter. Similarly, 
the respondent was unable to provide information 
on background studies that support or oppose the 
identity requirement for prepaid service in France. 
Responsibility for administration of this regulation 
is left up to each mobile phone operator 
with no apparent requirement to produce a 
compliance report for the government or other 
public authorities. There is also no evidence to 
suggest that measures have been taken by the 
government to monitor or enforce compliance 
of the regulation. Likewise, the mobile phone 
industry does not publish a corporate or industry 
wide code of practice regarding the collection of 
customer information for prepaid accounts.
The respondent was unable to specify if the 
government has sought opinion on alternative 
means for identifying prepaid subscribers and it 
is not known if a report is issued on public safety 
or law enforcement activities that might involve 
prepaid mobile users.
France does not have an Integrated Public 
Number Database (IPND) for the express purpose 
of public safety or law enforcement. In principle, 
the requirement for all mobile phone operators 
to maintain their own databases of customer 
records for prepaid accounts establishes the 
conditions needed for the creation of an IPND of 
prepaid customers. However, this is no evidence 
to suggest that such a step has yet been 
considered by the government of France or by 
the mobile phone industry.
Germany (DE)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
31,374 (55.9%) 31,338 (53.0%) Í 33,307 (51.4%) Í
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
Mobile phone operators in Germany are required 
by law to collect and retain customer information 
for all telephone subscriptions including prepaid 
service. This requirement was introduced in 
June 2004 under a new Telecommunications 
Act. Section () of the Act establishes this 
requirement:
Any person commercially providing or 
assisting in providing telecommunications 
services and in so doing allocating 
telephone numbers or providing 
telecommunications connections 
for telephone numbers allocated by 
other parties is … to collect, prior to 
activation, and store without undue 
delay the telephone numbers, the name 
and address of the allocation holder, the 
effective date of the contract, the date of 
birth in the case of natural persons, and 
in the case of fixed lines, additionally 
the address for the line, even if such 
data are not required for operational 
purposes; where known, the date of 
termination of the contract is likewise to 
be stored.
Section () further specifies that operators 
must amend customer records “without undue 
delay” when receiving notice of changes and 
attempt to collect, retroactively, any missing 
data on existing customers if this is deemed 
“possible at no special effort.” Upon termination 
of the contractual relationship, operators are 
required to retain that person’s data for one 
year, at which time it must then be erased. This 
section also states that “Compensation for data 
collection and storage is not paid.”
The Federal Network Agency or Bundesnetzagentur 
(BNetzA) has been given responsibility for 
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administering the identification requirements in 
Section 5 of the new Act. Under Section 5, 
the Bundesnetzagentur, formerly the Regulatory 
Authority for Telecommunications and Posts, 
is authorized “to enter and inspect” business 
premises and to issue fines to mobile operators 
not exceeding €20,000 in order to enforce the 
identity collection obligation under Section 
(). In certain cases additional powers are 
provided:
In the event of repeated violations of 
the provisions of section () … the 
activities of the person with obligations 
[to collection customer information] 
may be restricted by order of the 
Regulatory Authority in such a way that 
his customer base may not be changed, 
except as a result of contract expiry or 
notice of termination, until such time 
as the obligations ensuing from these 
provisions have been fulfilled. [Section 
5(2)]
In a worst-case scenario, the Bundesnetzagentur 
has the power to
… wholly or partially prohibit operation 
of the telecommunications system 
concerned or commercial provision of the 
telecommunications service concerned 
if less severe action to enforce proper 
conduct is insufficient. [Section 5()]
BNetzA has not yet produced a report on 
compliance with Section () and it is not 
known if such a report is planned for future. 
Similarly it is not known if BNetzA has yet taken 
action to enforce compliance with any mobile 
operators in Germany.
The provisions in the new legislation are the 
result of a compromise between the German 
parliament and the council of federal states. The 
idea to introduce mandatory identification for 
prepaid mobile phone service was first introduced 
by the Deutsche Bundesrat (council of federal 
states) in a draft version of the Act in October 
200. This arm of government “is primarily 
responsible for matters relating to public security 
and thus tend[s] to advocate far-reaching powers 
for law enforcement authorities.”
However, it has been reported that the Deutsche 
Bundestag (German parliament) rejected this 
provision, among others, and proposed in March 
2004 an “exemption” for prepaid mobile phones. 
In May 2004 a Mediation Committee presented 
a compromise that removed this exemption from 
the legislation. The Committee’s compromise 
also removed a provision that would have allowed 
mobile operators to be reimbursed for costs 
associated with providing customer data to law 
enforcement authorities. The Bundestag adopted 
the compromise on 6 May 2004, the Bundesrat 
on 4 May 2004. The new act came into effect 
in July 2004.7
It is not known for certain if either the Bundesrat 
or Bundestag sought expert or public opinion in 
conjunction with a proposed identity requirement 
for prepaid mobile phones. Nevertheless, there 
is some evidence to suggest that the government 
has not yet benefited from such opinion. On May 
24, 2002 in reference to the proposed changes 
to the Telecommunications Act, Germany’s 
Data Protection Commissioners issued a joint 
statement indicating that no research had been 
done on the question of prepaid registration and 
its value to law enforcement authorities.8
However, it was reported by the respondent that 
in 2005 the German regulator BNetzA issued a 
questionnaire to mobile operators to obtain data 
on feasibility and potential costs of proposed 
data retention provisions. It is not known if this 
survey included questions about prepaid service 
7  Background to the German Telecommunications Act 
of 2004 is reported by European Digital Rights (EDRI) in its 
EDRI-gram news bulletins number 2.0 (9 May 2004) and 
number 2.5 ( March 2004). Available online at http://
www.edri.org/
8  Entschließung der Datenschutzbeauftragten des 
Bundes und der Länder , “Geplanter Identifikationszwang in 
der Telekommunikation” [Resolution of the commissioners 
for data protection of the federation and the countries, 
“Planned identification obligation in telecommunications”] 
Statement dated 24 May 2002. Available online at http://
www.lfd.m-v.de/beschlue/ent2002.html#nr.
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or if a separate questionnaire was issued in 
relation to prepaid mobile phones, either before 
or after the new Telecommunications Act came 
into force.
Similarly, it is not known for certain if the German 
government has sought and/or received opinion 
on alternative means for identifying mobile phone 
customers. This is in contrast to reported use of 
IMSI-catcher technology in that country. The use 
of IMSI-catcher technology to intercept mobile 
phone calls is apparently allowed in the Federal 
Constitution Protection Law (Section 9.4) and 
its use has been reported in the German press. 
Usage of the IMSI-catcher is also regulated in 
section 00i of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(StPO). It was also mentioned in an early draft of 
the new Telecommunications Act in 200.
Despite the apparent use of IMSI-catcher and the 
identification requirements included in the new 
Telecommunications Act, the German government 
has not issued any public reports that indicate 
the cost of these measures to mobile operators 
or the benefits they are providing for law 
enforcement and national security authorities. 
An inquiry to the German regulator BNetzA yielded 
no mention of specific background research that 
might support a prepaid identification policy. 
However, a study by the Max Planck Institute for 
Foreign and Criminal Law published in May 200, 
did raise the practical problem of differentiating 
between registered users of mobile phones 
and the actual user of the phone at any given 
moment in time. Nonetheless, the overall finding 
of the study claims that telecommunications 
surveillance is an “important and indispensable 
instrument, which has led to the pursuable and 
fundamental success regarding investigations in 
specific fields” [respondent’s translation].
By contrast there is some evidence to suggest 
deliberate efforts by the German government 
to move ahead with legislation before research 
was completed. In a statement of June 2, 
2002 the Deutsche Bundesrat demanded a 
“general extension” of telecommunications 
surveillance, citing problems with crime that 
included terrorism, sexual offences, white collar 
crime, and trafficking in human beings. In that 
statement the Bundesrat claimed that it could 
not afford to wait for the results of studies into 
the effectiveness of telecom surveillance then 
being undertaken at the time (including the Max 
Planck study which had not yet been published).
There are a number of studies in Germany that 
oppose the extension of telecoms surveillance 
measures, including prepaid registration, on 
two grounds: constitutionality and cost recovery. 
Patrick Breyer, a German lawyer, published an 
extensive report in November 2004 and later 
filed a document with Federal Constitutional 
Court on June 20, 2005 that has raised a 
number of constitutional concerns with regard 
to the new Telecommunications Act in Germany. 
These concerns included the obligation of 
customers to provide personal information in 
the registration process for prepaid mobile 
phone service. According to the respondent, 
Breyer’s document claims that the new 
regulations are unconstitutional because they 
are “disproportional” insofar as “a public interest 
in the investigation and prevention of criminal 
acts does not [outweigh] private interests.” The 
respondent listed several arguments provided 
by Breyer to support this claim, including one 
that notes a specific problem with the prepaid 
registration policy:
The common good is not promoted since 
organized criminals are able to continue 
the anonymous use of prepaid mobile 
phones. For example, the use of false 
identities is not prevented since the 
Telecommunications Act does not oblige 
providers to verify any data provided by 
customers. [Respondent’s comment; 
question E]
The respondent also noted that mobile operators 
have sought to challenge data retention 
provisions in the new Telecommunications Act on 
constitutional grounds, but for a slightly different 
reason:
From the point of view of the 
[telecommunications service] providers 
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… the obligation to support public 
authorities with the implementation of 
a system to enable remote access to 
customer data is to be judged as an 
unequal and therewith unconstitutional 
treatment compared with other 
companies that provide communication 
services which do not have to collect and 
provide data as for example enterprises 
that transport mail and offer other postal 
services. Due to the public interests in 
the collection and transfer of data, the 
obligation of providers is seen as an 
illegitimate tax. [Respondent’s comment; 
question E]
Along similar lines, industry groups VATM and 
BITKOM have produced research studies on 
the associated costs of traffic data retention, 
arguing the need for appropriate compensation 
for mobile operators who are required to collect, 
retain, and disclose this data to law enforcement 
authorities. While important for other reasons, 
these studies are not primarily concerned with 
the specific privacy issue or costs associated 
with identity collection requirements for prepaid 
mobile phone service.
Despite the identity collection requirements in 
the new Telecommunications Act, there does 
not (yet) appear to be a common industry code 
of practice or agreed best practices for the 
collection, storage, or transfer of customer 
data to requesting authorities. General 
specifications for the contents of “customer 
data files” and for the method of data transfer 
are established in Section 2 of the Act, and 
the right of the government to establish specific 
technical procedures for data retrieval and 
transfer is established in Section 2(). It 
appears to be the case that the Act assigns the 
Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) an intermediary role 
in the retrieval and transfer procedures between 
requesting authorities and mobile operators:
The Regulatory Authority can, at all 
times, retrieve from customer files 
data for information requests from the 
authorities referred to in subsection (2) 
by means of automated procedures in 
the Federal Republic of Germany.
Authorities that are granted right of access to 
customer data files are specified in Section 
2(2):
• Courts and criminal prosecution authorities
• Federal and state police “for the purposes of 
averting danger”
• Customs Criminological Office
• National security agencies (Federal Armed 
Forces, Counter-Intelligence Office, and 
Federal Intelligence Office)
• Emergency service centres
• Federal Financial Supervisory Authority
• Authorities responsible for the prosecution 
of offences related to the Undeclared Work 
Act
The new Telecommunications Act does not 
establish a standalone Integrated Public Number 
Database (IPND), although the combined 
customer databases of mobile operators in 
Germany should, at least in principle, serve as a 
de facto IPND for requesting authorities. As such, 
the technical and legal procedures described in 
Section 2 of the Act, provide a basis for the 
administration of this collective database. A 
statement of requirements for public reporting 
of compliance issues and/or cost/benefit 
assessments of the Act’s provisions under 
Section  and 2 are not apparent in the 
new Telecommunications Act, although this has 
not been confirmed for this study.
Greece (GR)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
5,029 (63.1%) 6,066 (65.1%) È 6,757 (65.4%) È
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of Greece does not require 
mobile phone operators to collect customer 
information when activating prepaid service 
accounts. The respondent indicated that Hellenic 
law 2774/999 for the protection of personal 
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data establishes a statutory basis that prohibits 
collection of personal data from customers using 
prepaid cards, should those customers choose 
to remain anonymous. However, in cases where 
customers elect to provide personal details to 
a mobile operator, the Hellenic Data Protection 
Authority has issued a decision that obliges 
those operators to verify those details through 
an identity check and to ensure that customer 
records are accurate and up to date.
The government has not received expert or 
public opinion concerning the introduction of 
identity requirements for prepaid customers; 
however, the respondent stated that the Hellenic 
Data Protection Authority drew attention to and 
opposed a prepaid registration requirement in 
the draft bill for transposition of EU Directive 
2002/58/EC.
The Greek government has neither sought opinion 
on alternative means of identifying mobile phone 
customers, nor does it produce a report on law 
enforcement activities that might include details 
about prepaid customers.
In spite of data protection requirements to verify 
customer identity when collecting personal 
details, it is not known if mobile operators 
in Greece have developed either individual 
corporate policies or an industry-wide code of 
practice regarding data collection procedures. 
Similarly, the respondent did not indicate if 
the Data Protection Authority has published 
procedural requirements for the collection of 
personal details from prepaid mobile phone 
customers.
Greece does not maintain an Integrated Public 
Number Database (IPND) expressly for the 
purpose of law enforcement or public safety.
Hungary (HU)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
3,584 (72.2%) 5,378 (78.1%) È 6,157 (77.5%) Í
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of Hungary requires mobile 
phone operators to collect information from 
customers when activating prepaid and post-
paid accounts. This requirement is set out in the 
Electronic Communications Act (Act C of 200), 
which stipulates that customers must identify 
themselves at point of sale when purchasing 
prepaid phones. Article 29 (6) in Act C of 200 
describes the information required to establish 
an individual subscriber contract:
The individual subscriber contract 
concluded in writing shall contain at 
least the following provided that the 
specific features of the service make 
this possible: 
[…]
b)  name, residence, place of stay or seat of the 
subscriber;
c)  in the case of a natural person subscriber, 
the name (maiden name) of the subscriber, 
his/her mother’s name, and place and date 
of birth;
d)  in the case of a subscriber that is not a 
natural person, the trade registry number or 
other registration number of the subscriber 
and its bank account number;
Article 57 (2) indicates that service providers 
are obliged to collect details of the mobile phone 
SIM card and the IMEI (International Mobile 
Equipment Identification) number for each 
prepaid customer.
It is not known if the government of Hungary 
has sought or otherwise received expert or 
public opinion concerning the introduction of this 
requirement. Similarly, the respondent was not 
able to indicate if the government sought opinion 
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on alternative means of identifying mobile phone 
customers or if the government produces or 
makes available a report on law enforcement 
activities that might include details about prepaid 
users.
The respondent was not aware of background 
studies that either support or oppose the prepaid 
requirement; however, it was suggested that 
privacy complaints related to prepaid service 
would be filed with the Data Protection Officers 
who are responsible for internal data protection 
of organizations. The Office of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of 
Information is the general authority for enforcing 
rights to the protection of personal data. The 
Commissioner of this office is elected by 
Parliament and is able to operate independently. 
It is not known if any complaints have in fact 
been submitted to this office. However, during 
the last ten years, many inspections by the 
Commissioner in telecommunications revealed 
many incidences of illegitimate data handling 
at mobile service providers, including the use 
of subscriber data in direct marketing, copying 
documents and data collection, among others. 
There is no industry-wide code of practice for the 
collection of subscriber information from prepaid 
customers. The Hungarian Communications 
Authority and Ministry of Informatics and 
Communications were listed as government 
authorities designated to administer the identity 
requirements for prepaid service in Hungary. 
There is a provision in Act C of 200 under 5 
() that allows the Hungarian Communications 
Authority to enforce compliance through fines, 
however, it is not known if these measures have 
been used.
Hungary does not maintain an Integrated Public 
Number Database (IPND) for the express purpose 
of law enforcement or public safety.
Iceland (IS)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
88 (37.4%) 88 (33.7%) Í 112 (40.3%) È
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
Information was not received for Iceland.
Ireland (IE)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
1,967 (71.0%) 2,210 (71.8%) È 2,510 (73.4%) È
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of Ireland does not require 
mobile operators to collect customer information 
when activating prepaid accounts. The Irish 
government did consider a national register 
for G mobile phones as a measure to protect 
minors from harmful content. Following strong 
lobbying from the mobile phone industry, the 
government accepted technical proposals from 
the industry in November 2004 as an alternative 
to a national register.
Aside from the lobbying efforts of industry it is 
not known if there are any background studies 
produced by any organization that explicitly 
support or oppose an identity requirement for 
prepaid services in Ireland.
The respondent indicated that some mobile 
operators offer customers a €70 call credit if they 
register their details online, but this a voluntary 
measure for commercial purposes only.
In June 2004, the Irish Cellular Industry 
Association published a code of practice intended 
to promote the safe and responsible use of 
mobile phones, particularly among minors. The 
code of practice does not cover the collection of 
customer information but is instead concerned 
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with the use and disclosure of customer records. 
In particular, the respondent indicated that “it 
will allow operators to grant parents authorized 
access to their children’s prepaid mobile phone 
records and account details, so they can check 
what numbers have been called and what 
services have been accessed.”
The government of Ireland does not maintain 
an integrated public number database (IPND) 
expressly for the purpose of public safety and 
law enforcement.
Italy (IT)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
45,792 (89.6%) 47,732 (89.9%) È 51,705 (91.2%) È
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
A survey response was not received for Italy but 
recent news reports indicate that the government 
issued a decree on 27 July 2005 under its 
data retention legislation that has introduced 
compulsory identification for mobile telephones. 
The European Digital Rights bulletin EDRI-gram 
published details of the policy in August 2005:
Resellers of mobile subscriptions or pre-
paid cards must take all measures to 
guarantee the identity of [the] purchaser 
and keep a photocopy of each presented 
identity card. Article 7 decrees that all 
internet cafes and public telephone 
shops with at least  terminals must 
seek a license permit within 0 days 
from ‘questore,’ a local representative 
of the Ministry of Home Affairs. … WIFI-
points and locations that do not store 
traffic data will have to preventatively 
demand ID from their users. This actually 
already is common practice in Italy; 
hotspots at several airports for example 
will only allow internet usage after the 
user has entered the serial number of 
his ID card or drivers license.9
EDRI reports that this requirement is a subject of 
intense debate in Italy because of the high costs 
of compliance but further details are not known 
about the registration policy.
Japan (JP)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
1,847 (2.5%) 2,084 (2.6%) È 2,609 (3.0%) È
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of Japan requires mobile 
phone operators to collect information from 
customers when activating prepaid accounts. 
The registration requirements follow in the wake 
of concerns about phone scams known as “It’s 
me!” cases in 2004. The Ministry of Information 
and Communications (MIC) introduced new 
measures “to reinforce personal identity” 
with prepaid services and the government has 
passed legislation to control the sale and resale 
of prepaid phones. According to an MIC report 
published in 2005,
… the Law on Confirmation of Personal 
Identification of the Subscribers, etc. by 
Voice Mobile Communications Carriers 
and Prevention of Misuse of Voice Mobile 
Communications Services was proposed 
to the 62nd session of the Diet as a bill 
presented by a Diet member, and the 
bill was approved in April 2005. This law 
punishes acts including the following: an 
act of declaring a false name or address 
upon subscription, etc.; an act of 
commercially transferring mobile phones 
or PHS [Personal Handyphone System] 
to others for value without the consent 
9  Italy decrees data retention until  December 2007. 
(2005, Aug. 0). EDRI-Gram .6. Retrieved October, 2005. 
Available http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number.6/Italy 
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of the mobile phone/PHS carriers; an 
act of commercially lending mobile 
phones/PHS to others for value without 
confirming the name and address of the 
borrower; an act of transferring mobile 
phones/PHS owned by others.40
The registration requirement in Japan came 
into effect in April 2005 and all customers 
were required to register their prepaid mobile 
phones with their carrier by October , 2005. 
Customers not registered by the deadline would 
have their service suspended. It is not clear if the 
carriers are required to report to the government 
on the number of suspensions that have taken 
place after the deadline passed.
Two public hearings were held in 2004 (November 
4, 6) to bring mobile operators and consumer 
groups together with the government to discuss 
the problem of telephone fraud, including the 
role of prepaid services in such cases. Opinions 
voiced at the hearings may have played a role in 
the government decision to abandon an initial 
proposal that would have placed an outright ban 
on prepaid mobile phone service in that country. 
News reports indicate that this proposal, which 
was tabled by the government in October 2004, 
received considerable opposition from mobile 
carriers and from Japan’s European Business 
Community, which called it a “disproportionate 
response” to the problem.4 At the time, 
Japan’s largest mobile operator, NTT DoCoMo, 
declared it would stop selling prepaid phone 
service altogether, its president stating at a 
press conference that “DoCoMo considers 
prepaid phones unnecessary as they involve 
40  Japan Ministry of Internal Affair and Communications. 
(2005). Information and Communications in Japan: 
Stirrings of u-Japan. 2005. (p. 6). Available http://www.
johotsusintokei.soumu.go.jp/english/ 
4  European business slams Japan’s plan to ban prepaid 
cell phones. (2004, Nov. 0). Japan Today. Retrieved Dec. 
2, 2004. Available http://www.japantoday.com/e/?conten
t=news&cat=4&id=874 
various social problem.”42 It is not known if NTT 
DoCoMo has acted on this declaration in light 
of the registration policy that has replaced the 
proposed ban. 
Despite public opposition to the proposed ban 
and the high profile of the prepaid issue in 
Japan, the respondent was not able to provide 
information about any specific research studies 
that either support or oppose an identity 
requirement for prepaid service.
With the registration policy now in effect, 
customers are obliged to provide their personal 
details and identification not only at the time of 
initial activation but also when a prepaid phone 
is acquired from a third party through a private 
transfer. In such cases, the law requires that 
both customers contact the mobile operator to 
report the details of the transfer. Mobile operator 
Vodafone describes four distinct cases to help 
its customers understand the requirements:
• No registration: You did not register your 
customer information at time of purchase.
• Change of address: You registered your 
customer information at the time of 
purchase, but later changed your address.
• User change: You received a prepaid mobile 
phone from the person whose customer 
information was originally registered at the 
time of purchase.
• No longer in service: You registered 
your customer information at the time of 
purchase, but later gave the prepaid mobile 
phone away.
In the first two cases the current user of the 
prepaid mobile phone must visit a retail outlet 
with proof of identity to register or update their 
customer information with the operator. In 
the latter two cases, both the previous and the 
current user of the prepaid mobile phone must 
visit a retail outlet with proof of identity to update 
42  DoCoMo to stop offering prepaid cell phone services. 
(2004, Oct. ). Japan Today. Retrieved Oct. 26, 2004. 
Available http://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=news&ca
t=4&id=920 
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the customer information associated with that 
phone.4 Annex C contains a sample customer 
notification document.
The “It’s me!” scam involves elderly Japanese 
being contacted by strangers, often using 
prepaid mobile phones to disguise their identity. 
One news source indicates that over ninety per 
cent of cases involved a prepaid phone, although 
a source is not given for this claim.44 In these 
cases, the perpetrator pretends to be a relative 
in distress, who is in need of some quick cash 
and asks that money be transferred into a 
phoney bank account.
Records from the Japanese National Police 
Agency indicate a drop in incidents of reported 
“It’s me!” cases after the prepaid registration 
policy came into effect but this may also be 
related to independent police initiatives, such as 
a special task force that was established in late 
2004 to deal with rising incidents of telephone 
fraud.45
It is not known if either the Ministry of 
Information and Communications or the National 
Police Agency in Japan will produce a report on 
compliance with the registration requirements. 
Similarly, it is not known if any legal action 
has been taken to enforce compliance, but the 
legislation does permit the government to issue 
fines and prison terms for failure to comply with 
the regulations, although it is not clear to what 
extent mobile carriers are liable in cases of non-
compliance.
4  The Vodafone Japan website provides customers with 
information about registering their details when purchasing 
a prepaid mobile phone. Available: http://www.vodafone.jp/
english/products/index.html 
44  Japan rejects ban on prepaid mobiles. (2004, Nov. 6). 
Telecomasia.net. Retrieved Dec. 2, 2004. Available http://
www.telecomasia.net/telecomasia/article/articleDetail.
jsp?id=526 
45  Terrorist tracking center planned. (2004, Dec. 
4). Japan Times. Retrieved October, 2005. Available 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/news/nn2-2004/
nn200424f2.htm 
The government of Japan does not maintain an 
Integrated Public Number Database (IPND). It 
is not known under what terms and conditions 
mobile operators are required to make their 
records of prepaid customers available to the 
government.
Korea (KR)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
n/a 607 (1.9%) 591 (1.8%) Í
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
Information was not received for Korea.
Luxembourg (LE)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
179 (41.5%) 179 (37.9%) Í 318 (59.0%) È
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
Information was not received for Luxembourg.
Mexico (MX)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
19,974 (91.8%) 23,922 (92.3%) È 28,069 (93.3%) È
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of Mexico does not require 
mobile phone operators to collect customer 
information when activating prepaid service 
accounts. The respondent was uncertain if the 
government had either issued a public statement 
or sought expert or public opinion on this matter.
The respondent was not able to provide 
information on any background studies that 
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might support or oppose identity requirement for 
prepaid service in Mexico.
The respondent indicated that mobile phone 
operators do not publish a code of practice for 
collecting customer information from prepaid 
account holders.
Mexico does not have an Integrated Public 
Number Database (IPND) for the express purpose 
of public safety or law enforcement.
Netherlands (NL)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
7,500 (65.2%) 7,400 (62.7%) Í 8,100 (61.8%) Í
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of the Netherlands does not 
require mobile phone operators to collect 
customer information when activating prepaid 
service accounts. However, when prepaid cards 
were first introduced in that country (c. 997) 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs is purported to 
have proposed a ban on anonymous ownership 
to which the data protection authority (College 
Bescherming Persoonsgegevens) was opposed.
According to the respondent, an event was 
organized by a mobile operator in the Netherlands 
for law enforcement authorities to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of alternative means of 
identifying mobile phone users:
When prepaid was introduced, 
registration of users was discussed. 
Mobile operators themselves persuaded 
authorities (and law enforcement) not 
to introduce this obligation. [The mobile 
operator] invited some people (Justice, 
police) and showed them that if [it] was 
given two dates, periods and two places 
where somebody was seen calling, [the 
operator] could find the number calling 
… When this was proven, the discussion 
about registration ended. (Even though 
this doesn’t say anything about the 
identity of the user). [Response to 
question A4]
Despite this apparent rejection of a registration 
requirement, the European Digital Rights 
group EDRI reported in December 2004 that 
the government of the Netherlands requires 
operators of prepaid mobile phones to store 
location data for a period of three months.46 
However, this statement has not been verified.
The government does not publish a report on law 
enforcement or national security activities that 
might include information about prepaid phone 
users.
It is uncertain whether any background studies 
have been done that either support or oppose 
prepaid registration policy. The respondent 
suggested that the data protection authority 
(mentioned above) might have issued a public 
statement in its opposition to any such proposal.
There is no industry-wide code of practice 
regarding the collection of customer information 
from prepaid mobile phone subscribers in the 
Netherlands. At least one mobile operator offers 
an incentive to its prepaid customers to provide 
their details in exchange for a “top-up” bonus. 
The use and disclosure of these details is 
governed by existing data protection laws in the 
country and used for direct marketing activities.
The Netherlands does not have an Integrated 
Public Number Database (IPND) for the express 
purpose of public safety or law enforcement. 
However, the respondent stated that mobile 
operators are obliged to provide access to 
their customer databases for law enforcement 
purposes:
We … do have a database with details 
of all our subscribers and we do provide 
that information to law enforcement 
46  European Digital Rights. (2004). Bitkom research: 
no grounds for data retention. EDRI-gram 2.24. Available 
http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number2.24/retention 
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agencies. Actually we copy our database 
into a black box and the law enforcement 
agencies send their requests to 
that black box/database. This is an 
automated process using a third party. 
The legal aspects of this system are still 
discussed. … there is a lot of discussion 
about ‘who is the controller of the data 
in the black box database.’ Operators 
themselves can not access or look into 
the box. [Response to question D]
According to the respondent, the situation in the 
Netherlands “has the same result” as an IPND 
because law enforcement and other authorized 
agencies can send requests to several 
databases to establish a profile or look for a 
specific individual. The database administrator is 
purported to issue a report “every now and then” 
about the use of the databases. It is not known, 
however, if any form of measure is applied to 
assess the social value or provide a cost/benefit 
analysis of this system.
New Zealand (NZ)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
1,661 (68.6%) 1,737 (68.4%) Í 2,061 (69.7%) È
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of New Zealand does not 
require mobile phone operators to collect 
customer information when activating prepaid 
service accounts. A public statement from the 
government announced they have no plans to 
tighten controls on prepaid mobile phones47. 
However, the government has not sought expert 
or public opinion on this matter.
The respondent was not able to provide 
information on any background studies that 
47  Govt Says No To Tougher Prepaid Laws. (2006, March 
). The Press. Retrieved March 5, 2006 from http://www.
newsquest.co.nz.
might support or oppose identity requirement for 
prepaid service in New Zealand.
The respondent was not able to indicate if mobile 
phone operators publish a code of practice for 
collecting customer information from prepaid 
account holders.
New Zealand does not have an Integrated Public 
Number Database (IPND) for the express purpose 
of public safety or law enforcement.
Norway (NO)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
1,649 (43.8%) 1,774 (45.4%) È 1,769 (42.5%) Í
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
As of February , 2005 the government of Norway 
has required all providers of telephone services 
to collect information from new customers 
when activating accounts, including those for 
prepaid service. Existing customers were to be 
registered by August , 2005. After this deadline 
any unregistered prepaid phones or SIM cards 
were to be deactivated. It is not known how many 
deactivations have taken place since this time. 
The registration requirement is contained within 
new Regulations on Electronic Communications 
Networks and Services (Ekom Regulations) 
enacted on February 6, 2004. Section 6-2 of the 
Regulations establishes a general requirement 
for the collection of customer information for all 
types of telephone service:
Providers of public telephone services 
shall keep a list of each end-user’s 
name, address and number/address 
for services requested. The list shall 
contain information that enables the 
clear identification of those registered.
Section 6- of the Regulations provides a list of 
identity traits to be collected for each end-user:
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. unique ID: date of birth, personal 
identification number or organisation number, 
where this is recorded and unless otherwise 
agreed, or another self-defined unique ID 
number
2. surname/company name; where the legal 
owner of a subscription and the user are 
not the same, only the user’s name shall be 
transferred
. first name
4. middle name
5. street name or postal address
6. house number
7. postal code,
8. postal town,
9. telephone number
0. user type: i.e. whether the number is used 
for a fixed-line telephone, mobile telephone, 
or fax.
Additionally, section 6-2 states that
Providers of public telephone services 
shall free of charge and before listing 
takes place inform end-users about the 
purpose of publicly available printed or 
electronic directories in which information 
about the end-user will appear and of 
the possible use of the information as 
a result of the search capabilities of 
electronic directories. [emphasis added]
This disclosure requirement is notable for two 
reasons. Firstly because the requirement to 
inform end-users “before listing takes place” 
suggests that operators are obliged to tell 
customers at the point of sale, either through 
the wording in a contract or by word of mouth, 
about the reasons for collecting their personal 
information. The respondent to the survey 
indicated that there is no industry-wide code of 
practice published for this kind of procedure, but 
that at least one operator (Telenor) does include 
information about registration procedures in its 
subscription agreement. However, the document 
provided to validate this claim pre-dates 
enactment of the 2004 legislation.
The Regulation’s disclosure requirement is also 
notable because it refers to “the possible use” 
of customer information, which might include 
law enforcement and other national security 
activities. However, the wording of section 6-
2 does not refer to law enforcement or public 
safety, but is rather more concerned with the 
collection and use of end-user information to 
support public directory enquiry services.
The respondent indicated that the Norwegian 
Data Protection Authority was “surprised” by 
section 6-2 of the Regulations and issued an 
opinion to challenge it. In conjunction with 
this challenge, the Data Protection Authority 
apparently asked for a public debate on the 
issue by the Norwegian government but this has 
not taken place. The government of Norway did 
receive a number of opinions concerning the 
identification requirement in the new regulations. 
These documents include the opinion filed by the 
Data Inspectorate, by mobile operator Netcom, 
received by the government in September 
200. Details of the opinion are not principally 
related to the collection of information for 
prepaid service and instead address a wider 
set of concerns related to use, disclosure, and 
retention of personal data.
On 25 August 2004, the regulatory authority and 
other stakeholder groups met to discuss section 
6-2 of the legislation, particularly as it pertained 
to prepaid service. In a follow-up letter dated 29 
September, the regulator presented its proposed 
set of requirements for the registration of prepaid 
customers. These were () to obtain information 
“which makes unambiguous identification of the 
registered users possible;” (2) to ensure that “the 
information registered at the time of registration 
[is] of a certain quality;” () that any customer 
“should not be able to use the telephone until 
the registration is complete.48
Mobile operators Netcom and Sense expressed 
some concern with respect to this initial set 
of requirements. This was summarized in a 
subsequent letter issued by the Norwegian Post 
48  Annex D contains a copy of this letter translated into 
English.
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and Telecommunications Authority (NPT) to the 
mobile operators on 8 November 2004:
Netcom and Sense have raised 
objections … to the requirement that 
a mobile phone would not be enabled 
for use until the user has been 
unambiguously identified. The companies 
feel that in order to be able to meet this 
requirement a 24-hour customer service 
centre will have to be established, and 
this would be both expensive and time-
consuming. The companies therefore 
propose that it should still be possible 
to use the telephone for a limited 
period before the user is unambiguously 
identified. [translation]
With respect to the unambiguous identification 
requirement, NPT had determined in the 
September letter that “the end-user’s name, 
date of birth and address will in nearly all 
cases be sufficient to identify a particular 
person.” This determination alleviated concerns 
about the need for mobile operators to collect 
personal identification numbers from customers, 
a point which had previously concerned the 
Data Inspectorate. With regard to the quality 
assurance requirement, the NPT was asked 
by law enforcement authorities to consider 
strict requirements based on Norway’s Money 
Laundering Act (Hvitvaskingsloven) that would 
oblige mobile operators to conduct face-to-face 
identity checks with customers when activating 
prepaid service. It was this interpretation that 
appears to have prompted the mobile operators’ 
concern about 24-hour customer service 
centres.
In response, the NPT determined in the November 
letter that such a strict requirement was not 
warranted and that it would be impractical with 
prepaid service. Instead, the regulator stated 
its preference for an alternative validation 
procedure:
A minimum requirement for quality 
assurance is, however, that the 
registered information is checked against 
information in the national population 
register (Folkeregisteret). Applications for 
online permission or other permission 
can be sent to the Central Office for 
Population Registration (Sendtralkontoret 
for Folkeregistrering). As an equivalent 
check for customers who are foreign 
nationals would not be possible, NPT will 
at a later stage give further consideration 
to the registration of these customers 
if there proves to be a large number of 
false registrations. [translation]
The regulatory authority in this letter also 
indicated that mobile operators would also be 
held responsible for the accuracy of their existing 
customer records, implying that a monitoring and 
compliance program would be established:
For the sake of good order, NPT would 
like to remind providers that they also 
have a responsibility to ensure that 
the information they hold on existing 
customers is correct in relation to the 
demand for unambiguous identification. 
NPT has legal authority to set further 
demands pursuant to the provision of 
paragraph 0-6 of the Ekom Act if we 
learn of false registrations. [translation]
The Ekom Regulations, to which these 
determinations referred, are drawn on the 
basis of a new Electronic Communications Act 
(ekomloven) that entered into force in July 200. 
Under “General Provisions” section 2.8 of the 
Act requires that
Providers of electronic communication 
networks that are used for public 
electronic communications services and 
providers of such services shall operate 
networks and services so that statutory 
access to information on end users and 
electronic communications is assured.
The provider’s running costs connected 
with fulfilling this operating duty will 
be met by the state in regard to those 
additional costs resulting from these 
services.
 44 • Part II — Individual Country Profiles
What is notable about section 2.8 of the Act, 
quoted above, is that it does not make a 
distinction between various types of telephone 
service (prepaid/postpaid) or, for that matter, 
between electronic communications of any kind. 
Presumably it could therefore encompass all 
types of electronic communications, including 
Internet telephony and other forms of data 
transmission. As such, section 2.8 might provide 
the basis for regulations that called for any 
type of electronic communications device to be 
registered with end-user information. However, 
it should be stressed here that it is not clear 
as to whether this is an accurate interpretation 
of this section, or whether the government of 
Norway has considered such broad sweeping 
regulations.
Despite the public hearing held in conjunction 
with passage of the new Act and the new 
Regulations, the respondent to the survey could 
not identify any background studies that explicitly 
support or oppose an identity requirement for 
prepaid mobile phone service. It should be 
emphasized, however, that the legislation and 
regulations do not specifically mention prepaid 
services. Nonetheless, a media report in 
Norway’s Aftenposten from May 0, 200 quotes 
Inger Marie Sunde, chief public prosecutor of the 
Norwegian Economic Crime Unit Økokrim, stating 
that the presence of unregistered or falsely 
registered prepaid phones “is a dream situation 
for certain criminal circles and we have a great 
number of cases where it has emerged that 
organized criminals use mobile phones which are 
impossible to track back to their user.” Similarly, 
in the December 8, 2004 edition of Aftenposten, 
Agder police chief Arne Pedersen is quoted 
as saying “The use of cash cards by criminals 
allows them to remain anonymous to police. 
This often creates problems with police efforts 
to solve serious crimes.” These statements 
would suggest that some evidence is available 
to support a prepaid registration requirement, 
but the respondent to this survey was unable 
to locate any documented sources that might 
validate these claims.
The respondent indicated that the government 
does issue a report on law enforcement activities 
that might include information on prepaid phone 
users. However, this response was a slight 
misinterpretation of the question and referred 
to a document circulated by law enforcement 
agencies on November 4, 200 about the 
potential impact of international cybercrime 
initiatives on Norwegian law. Apparently mobile 
phone registration is mentioned in the document 
but no specific opinion is stated.
Norway does not have an Integrated Public 
Number Database (IPND) expressly for the 
purpose of public safety or law enforcement. It is 
not clear whether data gathered from individual 
mobile operators might be aggregated by the 
regulatory Authority or other government agency 
for this purpose.
Poland (PL)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
5,120 (47.6%) 7,375 (53.1%) È 9,467 (54.4%) È
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of Poland does not require 
mobile phone operators to collect customer 
information when activating prepaid service 
accounts. The respondent indicated that a 
proposal to introduce a registration requirement 
was put forward several times by the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Administration, Internal 
Security Agency, and the Ministry of National 
Defense. The Polish Ministry of Infrastructure 
issued a public statement on May , 2004 in 
conjunction with its proposed changes to the 
Telecommunications Act:
It was argued that appropriate provisions 
in question should be introduced for the 
purpose of prevention and counteracting 
terrorism and organized crime. However, 
mobile phone operators expressed their 
opposition to those solutions which 
would result in considerable financial 
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costs on their part. [Response to 
question E]
Another criticism of the proposal was that its 
wording was so vague as to potentially oblige 
Polish internet portal-sites to register the 
identities of their free email users. The European 
Digital Rights newsletter EDRI-gram cites a 
Reuters news report from May , 2004 (“Polish 
Web Portals Criticise Draft telecoms Law”) that 
describes this opposition to the proposals.49
The proposed regulation was removed from the 
final version of Telecommunications Law that was 
adopted by the government on 6 July 2004.
It is not known if the government has sought 
alternative means for identifying prepaid 
users or if the government issues a report on 
law enforcement activities that might include 
information about prepaid users.
It is not known if there are any background 
studies that either support or oppose a prepaid 
registration policy in Poland and there is no 
industry-wide code of practice for the voluntary 
collection of prepaid customer details.
Poland does not maintain an integrated public 
number database (IPND) for the express purpose 
of law enforcement or public safety.
Portugal (PT)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
6,366 (79.8%) 6,690 (78.4%) Í 7,354 (78.7%) È
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of Portugal does not require 
mobile phone operators to collect customer 
information when activating prepaid service 
49  Polish proposal to demand ID for pre-paid cards. (2004, 
June 2). European Digital Rights: EDRI-gram. Available 
http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number2./prepaid 
accounts. The government has neither issued 
a public statement nor sought expert or public 
opinion on this matter.
The respondent was not able to provide 
information on any background studies that 
might support or oppose identity requirement for 
prepaid service in Portugal.
The respondent was not able to indicate if mobile 
phone operators publish a code of practice for 
collecting customer information from prepaid 
account holders.
Portugal does not have an Integrated Public 
Number Database (IPND) for the express purpose 
of public safety or law enforcement.
Slovak Republic (SK)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
1,536 (71.5%) 1,961 (67.1%) Í 2,284 (62.1%) Í
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of the Slovak Republic requires 
the identification of all telephone subscribers, 
including those with prepaid service. Section 
42() of the Electronic Communications Act of 
December , 200 establishes this requirement:
[The mobile operator is obliged to] keep 
a register of personal data … of all 
subscribers of its network, including the 
subscribers of pre-paid services, in case 
a user is assigned a telephone number 
on buying such a service. 
Section 55() of the Act sets out information 
that qualifies for data protection and which 
presumably must be collected by mobile 
operators under Section 42() for all prepaid 
customers:
… name, surname, academic degree, 
and address in case of a natural person 
or business name and seat in case of a 
legal entity or business name and place 
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of business in case of an entrepreneur—
natural person, telephone number, if it 
should remain private on the request 
of the user and category of access 
to the network; data published in the 
directories of subscribers are not subject 
to telecommunications privacy.
The respondent indicated that all customers of 
mobile operators must provide “basic ID from 
their personal ID card [obciansky preukaz] or from 
a valid international passport.” These details are 
retained by the mobile operator and disclosed 
to law enforcement authorities when requested 
through formal procedures. This requirement is 
found in Section 57(2) of the Act:
The undertaking providing networks, 
services or networks and services 
shall be entitled to obtain and process 
personal data of users, which include, 
besides data referred to in Section 55, 
Subsection , Letter b) also the birth 
registration number, ID card number or 
number of a different identity proof and 
nationality, only for the purposes of:
a) concluding, performance, change or 
termination of the contract, 
b)  billing and registration of receivables, 
c)  elaboration of directories of subscribers, 
d) provision of information within activities 
of co-ordination and operation centres of 
emergency calls,
e)  co-operation and provision of 
collaboration pursuant to [law 
enforcement purposes set out in] 
Section 55, Subsection 6. 
Section 55(6) in turn, establishes the disclosure 
requirements in relation to Slovak law 
enforcement authorities:
The undertaking shall be obliged to:
a)  co-operate with the Police Corps and 
other authorities active in criminal 
proceedings in investigation of malicious 
calls and of disseminating alarming 
information … 
b) provide necessary co-operation to 
courts, prosecutors and other state 
administration authorities pursuant to 
special regulations and provide them 
free of charge, on the base of a written 
request and in line with the respective 
regulations, with information, which is 
subject to telecommunications privacy 
or to which protection of personal data 
applies, if the provision of the information 
or data is necessary for fulfilment of 
particular tasks of these bodies under 
the Act; 
Having collected this information, mobile 
operators are obliged to conform to data 
protection requirements of the Slovak Republic, 
which are harmonized with relevant EU Directives. 
As such, the respondent indicated that industry 
“codes of practice are not necessary from the 
data protection point of view” because “the law 
is clear enough and binding enough.” However, 
this comment seems to pertain to the use and 
disclosure of customer data rather than with the 
initial collection at the point of sale.
Section 57(5) of the Act requires that mobile 
operators “inform the subscriber about what 
personal data shall be obtained and processed, 
on the basis of what legal document, for what 
purpose and for how long the data will be 
processed.” However, the respondent did 
not specify if mobile operators in the Slovak 
Republic have discussed or established a 
model procedure for informing customers of the 
rights and responsibilities associated with the 
actual collection of personal details for prepaid 
service. Similarly, it is not known if the mobile 
operators are obliged to produce regular reports 
on compliance with the identity requirement or if 
the government has ever taken action to enforce 
compliance.
Section 57() of the Act indicates that customer 
records must be destroyed after termination of 
the contract, although it is uncertain how this is 
to be determined in the case of prepaid accounts 
where such termination may not be immediately 
apparent to a mobile operator. Also uncertain in 
this case is the responsibility of mobile operators 
to erase or update customer records with respect 
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to the transfer of ownership of a prepaid phone 
or SIM card. The section is also somewhat 
ambiguous with respect to certain exceptions to 
the erasure requirement, particularly in terms of 
law enforcement or public safety purposes:
The undertaking shall erase personal 
data without delay upon termination of 
contractual relations. Exceptions are 
possible only for the purposes of billing 
or entering of payments, registration, 
and enforcement of receivables of the 
undertaking for the provided service, for 
handling of users’ requests or in order to 
comply with other legal obligations and to 
exercise rights. [emphasis added]
It is not known if the government has sought or 
otherwise received opinion regarding the prepaid 
registration policy in the Slovak Republic. 
Similarly, the respondent was unable to specify 
any public documents that would point to 
specific background studies that either support 
or oppose the requirement.
The respondent did suggest “there is a very high 
probability” that law enforcement authorities 
have alternative means at their disposal for 
identifying prepaid users, but also indicated that 
the government has not sought opinion on this 
matter. It is not known if the law enforcement 
authorities make available a report on activities 
that might include users of prepaid services.
The Slovak Republic does not maintain an 
Integrated Public Number Database (IPND) for 
the express purpose of law enforcement or public 
safety.
South Africa (non-OECD)50
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
n/a n/a n/a
The government of South Africa requires mobile 
phone operators to collect information from 
customers when activating prepaid accounts. 
Prepaid registration falls under Regulation of 
Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act of 2002. 
It is not known if expert or public opinion was 
sought concerning the introduction of the policy. 
The respondent is unable to provide information 
about government studies in relation to a 
prepaid registration policy or alternative means 
of identifying prepaid customers.
Chapter 7 of the Act sets out the requirements:
40.() Before any person sells or in 
any other manner provides, any cellular 
phone or SIM-card to any other person, 
he or she—
(a) must, if the receiver of that cellular 
phone or SIM-card is a natural person—
(i) obtain from him or her—
 (aa) his or her full names, identity 
number, residential and business or 
postal address, whichever is applicable; 
and
 (bb) a certified photocopy of his or her 
identification document on which his 
or her photo, full names and identity 
number, whichever is applicable appear;
(ii)  retain the photocopy obtained in terms 
of subparagraph (i)(bb); and
(iii) verify the photo, full names and identity 
number. whichever is applicable, of 
50 South Africa is a non-OECD country and was not 
included in the original sample frame for the study.  However, 
contact with a representative from the mobile industry in that 
country has provided details about its prepaid registration 
policy, which were deemed relevant to the report.
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that person with reference to his or her 
identification document …
[ … ]
(c) may obtain from the receiver of that 
cellular phone or SIM-card any other 
information which the person who 
sells or in any other manner provides 
the cellular phone or SIM-card deems 
necessary for purposes of the Act.
(2)  A person referred to in subsection () 
must ensure that proper records are 
kept of—
 (a) the information, including the 
photocopies, referred to in subsection 
() and, where applicable, any change in 
such information which is brought to his 
or her attention;
 (b) the cellular telephone number or 
any other number allocated to the other 
person;
 (c) the number of the cellular phone 
concerned; and
 (d) any other information in respect 
of the other person which the person 
concerned may require in order to enable 
him or her to identify that other person.
Other provisions in the Act include a requirement 
for customers to report any loss, theft, or 
destruction of their mobile phone to the police. 
In addition, persons who are found with a mobile 
phone and unable to give “a satisfactory account 
of such possession” may, if there is reasonable 
suspicion, may be charged with possessing 
stolen property.
The wording of the Act creates potential problems 
for administering and enforcing the registration 
policy, as the respondent indicates:
[The] Act proposes a paper-based 
collection and retention of certified 
identity documents by each person 
that sells or otherwise provides a SIM 
or handset. Due to extensive use of 
informal distribution channels, mobile 
operators are proposing an electronic 
registration process of storing data in a 
centralized database [under the control 
of] each operator. [Response to question 
E]
Despite the difficulties and cost associated with 
managing such a decentralized registration policy, 
the respondent was not able to identify any 
studies that explicitly opposed the requirement. 
Furthermore, mobile operators and retailers 
have not published a corporate or industry-wide 
code of practice on the collection of customer 
information that might standardize or streamline 
the procedure.
The government does not make available a report 
on law enforcement activities that might include 
prepaid users. The government does not produce 
a report on compliance with the requirements 
and it is not known if any action has been taken 
to enforce compliance.
South Africa does not maintain an Integrated 
Public Number Database (IPND) expressly for 
the purpose of law enforcement or public safety 
purposes. It is not known on what terms and 
conditions the government is permitted access 
to the records of prepaid users held by retailers 
or mobile operators.
Spain (ES)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
19,171 (65%) 21,122 (63.0%) Í 21,894 (58.4%) Í
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of Spain does not require the 
registration of prepaid mobile phones. The 
respondent indicated that a public statement 
was issued on this matter in 2002/200 but no 
further details were provided.
A media report from May 9, 2002 indicates 
that while it was holding the presidency of the 
European Union, the government of Spain 
tabled a proposal for adopting harmonized 
regulations across the EU for identifying users of 
prepaid mobile phones. According to the report, 
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the Spanish proposal included the following 
statement:
The ministers recognises [sic] with 
concern that use of prepaid telephone 
cards under present conditions of 
anonymity for users prevents the 
implementation of the requirements and 
principles laid down in [the 995 Council 
Resolution on the lawful interception 
of telecommunications]. … The lack 
of regulation of anonymous prepaid 
telephone cards clashes with the need 
for law enforcement agencies to have 
access to telecommunications.5
The proposal also purported to claim that 
criminal use of prepaid mobile phones is 
“‘so hampering investigations into organized 
crime’ that the scope for action should at least 
be explored.” Such a statement implies the 
existence of evidence to support such a claim 
but the respondent to our study not able to 
provide information on any background studies 
in relation to proposed identity requirement for 
prepaid service in Spain or in the EU.
Related to Spain’s proposal, a European 
Commission bulletin from May 200 reported its 
conclusions “on the tracing of the use of prepaid 
mobile telephone cards, in order to facilitate 
criminal investigations.” These conclusions 
were adopted on 8 May 200 with the following 
wording:
Reiterating that the implementation of 
communications interception measures 
must respect the right to privacy laid 
down in Member States’ national laws 
and in Directive 2002/58/EC, the 
Council points out that prepaid telephone 
cards, used anonymously, constitute 
an attractive means of communication 
for individuals and organisations 
pursuing illegal ends. Considering 
5  van Buuren, Jelle. (2002, May 9). EU wants 
identification system for users of prepaid telephone cards. 
Telepolis. Retrieved Dec. 20, 2004. Available http://www.
heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/2/2574/.html 
such use to be contrary to the 
principles of its resolution on the lawful 
interception of telecommunications, 
the Council recommends that Member 
States consider a set of appropriate 
requirements for tracing the use of 
prepaid card technology in connection 
with organised crime, paying particular 
attention to current technological 
progress in the field.52
It may be reasonable to assume that the 
Council’s conclusions in 200 are related at least 
in part to the Spanish proposal tabled in 2002. 
It is important to note that the conclusions do 
not specifically mention an identity requirement 
but instead provide a flexible framework that 
emphasizes technological means for tracing “the 
use” of prepaid cards rather than “the users” 
of the cards. The distinction may be important 
insofar as it recognizes that purchaser of a 
prepaid mobile phone might not be the same 
person that uses it.
The respondent was not able to indicate if 
Spanish mobile phone operators publish a code 
of practice for collecting customer information 
from prepaid account holders.
Spain does not have an Integrated Public Number 
Database (IPND) for the express purpose of 
public safety or law enforcement.
52  European Commission. (200, May 8). Bulletin EU 5-
200, Area of freedom, security and justice (0/8), .4.0. 
Council conclusions on the tracing of the use of prepaid 
mobile telephone cards, in order to facilitate criminal 
investigations. Bulletin of the European Union. Retrieved 
Dec. 20, 2004. Available http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/
bull/en/20005/p0400.htm 
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Sweden (SE)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
3,536 (49.4%) 4,333 (54.5%) È 5,003 (56.8%) È
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of Sweden does not require 
mobile phone operators to collect customer 
information when activating prepaid service 
accounts. The government has neither issued 
a public statement nor sought expert or public 
opinion on this matter.
The respondent was not able to provide 
information on any background studies that 
might support or oppose an identity requirement 
for prepaid service in Sweden.
The respondent was not able to indicate if 
Swedish mobile phone operators publish a code 
of practice for collecting customer information 
from prepaid account holders.
Sweden does not have an Integrated Public 
Number Database (IPND) for the express purpose 
of public safety or law enforcement; however, the 
respondent indicated that emergency services in 
Sweden might have a resource similar to an IPND 
through the SOS Alarm initiative.
Switzerland (CH)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
2,154 (40.8%) 2,315 (40.4%) Í 2,601 (42.0%) È
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The Swiss government introduced mandatory 
identification for prepaid mobile phones in 2004. 
Article 5 of la loi fédérale sur la surveillance de 
la correspondance par poste et télécommunication 
(LSCPT) provides a general obligation for 
telecommunications providers on data retention. 
Related to this statutory provision was an 
amendment made in June 2004 to regulations 
governing the collection of customer information 
under l’Ordonnance sur la surveillance de la 
correspondance par poste et télécommunication 
(OSCPT). Article 9a of the OSCPT states:
Les fournisseurs de services de 
télécommunication doivent s’assurer 
que, lors de la vente de cartes SIM à 
prépaiement, les données personnelles 
du client (nom, prénom, adresse, date 
de naissance) sont enregistrées sur 
présentation d’un passeport ou d’une 
carte d’identité valable ou d’un autre 
document de voyage reconnu pour entrer 
en Suisse. Le type et le numéro de la 
pièce d’identité doivent également être 
saisis.5
Mobile operators and customers in Switzerland 
were notified on June 2004 that the Swiss 
government would enact the prepaid policy on 
August , 2004, and that all prepaid SIM cards 
purchased after November , 2002 would 
have to be registered. The government set 
October , 2004 as the retroactive registration 
deadline, stating that customers not complying 
with the regulation would have their service cut-
off by the mobile operator until registration was 
undertaken. Samples of Swisscom’s customer 
notification website and its customer registration 
form are provided in Annex F and Annex G.
Shortly after the deadline passed, the European 
Digital Rights group published a news report 
stating that mobile operator Swisscom had been 
forced to disconnect 0,000 unregistered users 
of prepaid mobile phones as of November 0, 
2004 for failing to comply with the regulation.54
5  Le Conseil fédéral suisse. (2004, Jun. 2). Ordonnance 
sur la surveillance de la correspondance par poste et 
télécommunication. Retrieved Oct., 2005. Available http://
www.uvek.admin.ch/imperia/md/content/gs_uvek2/d/
kommunikation/fernmelde/4.pdf 
54  0.000 prepaid GSMs disconnected in Switzerland. 
(2004, Dec. 5). European Digital Rights: EDRI-gram. 
Retrieved Dec. 2, 2004. Available http://www.edri.org/
edrigram/number2.24/prepaid 
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The introduction of prepaid regulations in 
Switzerland follows a widely disseminated 
media story reporting a successful anti-terrorist 
operation “Mont Blanc” that traced suspicious 
calls to Swisscom prepaid phones. It is believed 
that Swisscom was used partly because it offered 
an international prepaid roaming capability. 
Some time after this incident was reported, 
a commercial website selling prepaid cards 
announced “Swisscom International Prepaid SIM 
Card stopped working as of December st, 200,” 
suggesting that the operator has discontinued 
this feature. This has not been verified. It is 
also interesting to note the comments of one 
counter-terrorism official in Europe who claimed 
that the mobile phone was “one of the most 
effective tools we had to locate Al Qaeda … The 
perception of anonymity may have lulled them 
into a false sense of security.”55
Under the new regulation mobile operators are 
now obliged to collect and retain for two years, 
the name, address, birth date, and record the 
number of an approved identification document 
(passport, etc.) prior to activating any prepaid 
account. This two year period applies from the 
date when prepaid service is terminated. The 
termination of a prepaid account corresponds 
to the conclusion of the contract between the 
customer and the provider, corresponding to 
the initial registration. An interpretation of the 
regulation by the government’s Department 
of Environment, Transport, Energy and 
Communication (DETEC) indicates that identity 
documents carried by certain groups within 
Switzerland, such as asylum seekers, are not 
valid for prepaid registration.56
55  van Natta, Don and Butler, Desmond. (2004, Mar. 4). 
How Tiny Swiss Cellphone Chips Helped Track Global Terror 
Web. New York Times
56  Suisse Département fédéral de l’environnement, des 
transports, de l’énergie et de la communication (DETEC). 
(2005, Mar. 5). FAQ: enregistrement (a posteriori) des cartes 
SIM à prépaiement. Retrieved Oct., 2005. Available http://
www.uvek.admin.ch/ 
While there is no legal obligation for customers 
to notify the mobile operator or government of 
any transfer of ownership or resale of a prepaid 
phone or SIM card, the original registered owner 
of the device could be liable for its subsequent 
use in illegal activities. The DETEC interpretation 
on this matter reads as follows:
Quelles peuvent être, pour la personne 
enregistrée, les conséquences de la 
revente ou de la transmission à un tiers 
de sa carte SIM à prépaiement ?
La revente ou la transmission d’une 
carte à prépaiement à un tiers n’est en 
soi pas punissable.
En revanche, la revente ou la transmission 
d’une carte à un tiers peut, en cas 
d’utilisation pour des actes punissables, 
avoir des conséquences pénales pour la 
personne enregistrée. Celle-ci peut, par 
exemple, être poursuivie pénalement 
pour entrave à l’action pénale ou lorsque 
les conditions du Code pénal en matière 
de participation ou de complicité sont 
remplies.57
In cases where a mobile phone was purchased 
as a gift prior to the registration requirement 
coming into the force, only the active owner of it 
was required to register before the October 2004 
deadline.
It is not known if opinion was sought on 
alternative measures to the registration 
requirement, but the government did form 
a committee following the terrorist attacks 
of  September 200 in order to consider 
the issue as part of a wider package of anti-
terrorism legislation. According to parliamentary 
records, the committee recommended against 
the proposal for a prepaid registration policy 
but this was rejected by the Council of States, 
which voted in favour of adopting the regulation. 
During debate on the matter, the argument was 
57  ibid.
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put forward that the measure would be of little 
consequence for most consumers but would 
act as a deterrent to criminal and terrorist acts. 
The following is the transcript of comments on 
this point made by government member Doris 
Leuthard speaking in the Swiss Parliament in 
March 200 (in German):
Ich mache mir nicht die Illusion, zu 
glauben, mit der Registrierung werde 
inskünftig der organisierten Kriminalität 
das Handwerk gelegt, aber das Leben 
wird ihr schwerer gemacht. Es gibt 
Umgehungsmöglichkeiten, aber sie sind 
aufwendig. Man muss daran denken, und 
man kennt die Umgehungsmöglichkeiten. 
Es gibt solche Umgehungsmöglichkeiten 
im Übrigen auch beim Fälschen 
von Pässen, von Urkunden, von 
Autonummern. Das ist so, dass immer 
Missbrauchsmöglichkeiten entstehen. 
Es besteht mit der Registrierung auch 
keine Gefahr, dass wir einen Polizeistaat 
eröffnen. Es geht am Schluss um das 
Abwägen zwischen den Gütern Sicherheit 
und Bekämpfung der organisierten 
Kriminalität auf der einen Seite und dem 
Persönlichkeitsschutz, dem Schutz der 
Privatsphäre, auf der anderen Seite.58
It is not known if the government issues a regular 
report on law enforcement activities that includes 
information on prepaid users. However, in the 
58  Conseil national Suisse. (200, Mar. 2). Conventions 
des Nations Unies pour la répression du financement 
du terrorisme et des attentats terroristes à l’explosif. 
Ratification. Amtliches Bulletin. Retrieved Oct., 2005. 
Available http://www.parlament.ch/ab/frameset/d/
n/467/77205/d_n_467_77205_77220.htm The following 
is a rough translation into English: “I do not put myself under 
the illusion to believe with the registration that organized 
criminality will be handicapped in the future but their world is 
made more difficult [by it]. There are evasion possibilities but 
they are complex. … There are many evasion possibilities 
in falsifying passports, documents, license numbers [etc.]. 
There are always possibilities for abuse to develop. There is 
with the registration no danger that we will create a police 
state. The protection of the private sphere, on the one hand, 
must be considered against threats to national security and 
the fight against organized criminality on the other hand … 
.”
course of the parliamentary debate, statistics 
provided by Swiss law enforcement agencies that 
were cited by Leuthard, indicated some 60-70 
per cent of intercept operations involved prepaid 
phones and that prepaid was used in 90-00 per 
cent cases of organized crime.59
Mobile operators in Switzerland administer 
registration requirements and must disclose 
details on request from authorized government 
agencies. Operators are obliged by law to 
retain customer records for two years. It is not 
known if the government will produce a report 
on compliance with the requirement, or if it has 
acted to enforce compliance.
Switzerland does not maintain an integrated 
public number database (IPND) for the purpose 
of public safety or law enforcement. It is not 
known if the government has considered the 
introduction of an IPND either in the proceedings 
leading up to or following the introduction of 
prepaid regulations. Nevertheless, there is a 
special “Call Centre Information System” (CCIS) 
available for penal law enforcement authorities. 
The CCIS contains information about all phone 
numbers used in Switzerland, even if these 
numbers aren’t included in publicly available 
number directories.
Turkey (TR)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
11,500 (62.4%) 17,125 (73.4%) È 20,851 (74.8%) È
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
Information was not received for Turkey.
59  ibid.
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United Kingdom (UK)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
31,037 (69.1%) 33,758 (67.6%) Í 36,000 (67.9%) È
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of the United Kingdom does 
not require mobile phone operators to collect 
customer information when activating prepaid 
service accounts. The government has neither 
issued a public statement nor sought expert or 
public opinion on this matter.
The Interception of Communications Commissioner 
in the UK submits an annual report to the 
government, containing information on telecom 
interception activities. The report is required by the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, is 
laid before Parliament and subsequently published; 
however, the document apparently includes 
a confidential annex detailing the operational 
successes achieved as a result of interception 
warrants that the Commissioner’s office has 
reviewed. Although the Commissioner’s report is 
not specifically about prepaid services, it might 
contain information about intercepts warrants 
issued in respect of prepaid mobile phones.
The respondent was not able to provide 
information on any specific background studies 
that might support or oppose identity requirement 
for prepaid service in the United Kingdom. The 
respondent did, however, provide a copy of a 
memo developed by the Mobile Broadband Group 
(MBG) in anticipation of calls for compulsory 
registration in the UK. The MBG is an association 
of the five major UK mobile network operators, 
all opposed to a mandatory registration policy for 
prepaid. The memo does not reflect the findings of 
any systematic study of the question, but instead 
introduces six points on which its opposition to 
prepaid registration is founded:
1. Social inclusion: the MBG argues that 
a prepaid registration policy would be 
“a retrogressive step” in the otherwise 
successful role prepaid services have played 
in providing access to telephone service for 
socially disadvantaged groups such as “the 
homeless, the transient and those with poor 
credit records …” The MBG suggests that 
a registration policy would eliminate or cut-
off many of these customers from access to 
affordable telephone service.
2. Practicality: with over 5-million prepaid 
customers in the UK, the MBG argues that 
a registration policy faces practical barriers 
because retail outlets are not equipped 
to deal with the “logistics” of validating 
customer identification, and that it would 
require “a massive exercise to compel the 
existing base [of users] to comply with a 
registration scheme.” Moreover, the MBG 
claims that operators would be required to 
cut off service in cases of non-compliance, 
“causing major disruption to service and 
potentially putting customers at risk.”
3. Effectiveness: an additional burden on 
operators, according to the MBG, would 
be ensuring that the customer database is 
accurate and up to date. The MBG highlights 
the problem of compelling customers to 
notify operators of change of address or 
ownership of the mobile phone, suggesting 
that the government would have to introduce 
a coercive enforcement regime using fines or 
other penalties to force customers to comply 
with the requirement. Furthermore, the MBG 
claims that such efforts would be wasted 
because “it is … hard to imagine that 
criminals, if they really wanted to cover their 
tracks, would not find a way of getting round 
the verification process, either by using a 
false identity or using a stolen phone.”
4. Customer choice: the MBG claims that 
prepaid customers choose the service partly 
because of the convenience of there being 
no associated paperwork. With respect to 
privacy concerns, the MBG suggests that 
customers “also believe that it is likely 
within their rights to buy and use telephony 
services without being answerable to the 
mobile operator or the government.”
5. Cost: in the absence of detailed cost/
benefit analysis, the MBG used the UK’s 
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DVLA (Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency) 
database as a benchmark to estimate the 
impact of a prepaid registration policy. The 
DVLA database contains about 0-million 
vehicle registrations, with -million new 
vehicles added and some 4-million transfers 
of ownership each year. According to the 
MBG the cost of the DVLA is £70-million 
per annum to administer, which is offset 
by returns of £4-billion in vehicle excise 
duties and fines.60 The MBG then draws a 
comparison with the cost of administering a 
national database for prepaid customers:
 Putative equivalent databases for [prepaid 
customers] would support a similar size 
(40 million) but, in all likelihood, would 
have to cope with a far larger number of 
transactions—particularly new registrations 
and customers churning between networks, 
which can amount to 20% of the whole base 
in any one year. Pre-pay SIMS are virtually 
disposable consumer goods, not significant 
personal assets. Furthermore the SIMS 
databases would not deliver anything like 
the law enforcement or financial payback 
of the DVLA, which is a profit centre for 
the Government. They may simply make it 
easier to trace the perpetrators of crime and 
malicious calls. It is easy to imagine that 
a database could cost at least £6 per SIM 
per annum to administer. £200-million on 
crime detection that could be better spent 
elsewhere.6
6. Registrable services: in spite of its opposition 
to a general registration policy for prepaid 
services, the MBG does recognize that such 
a measure is appropriate in certain specific 
cases:
The mobile operators are clear that it 
would be completely disproportionate 
to require a comprehensive verified 
database for all pre-paid subscribers. 
However, there may be examples where 
60  Approximately $52-million (CAD); ($297-million USD); 
(€252-million EUR).
6  About $2.50 (CAD) per SIM, per annum.
it is appropriate that customer give their 
names and addresses (and have them 
verified by the networks) before they get 
access to specific services. One example 
of this today—and there may be others 
in the future—is the provision of passive 
location based services that are used 
[by parents] to locate children. …
… Parents and carers gain comfort 
from these services but also want to 
be sure that location products are not 
used by people that have no bona fide 
interest in the whereabouts of their 
children. It is therefore quite right that 
mobile operators verify the identity of 
users of location both as a deterrent to 
miscreants signing up and as a record to 
fall back on in the event of misuse.
The United Kingdom does not have an Integrated 
Public Number Database (IPND) for the express 
purpose of public safety or law enforcement. 
However, UK authorities do make use of two 
independent databases for tracking stolen 
handsets—the Central Equipment Identity 
Register (CEIR) and the Mobile Equipment 
National Database (MEND)—but these do are 
not properly classified as IPND systems.62
62  CEIR is an international service operated by the 
GSM Association that contains equipment identity details 
only: “The CEIR is a unique computer located in the 
GSM Association headquarters in Dublin, Ireland. It is a 
global central database containing information on serial 
number (IMEI) ranges of millions of handsets that have 
been approved for use on GSM networks. These approved 
handsets make up what is called the White List. There is 
also a CEIR Black List, which contains millions of handsets 
that should be denied service on a GSM network because 
they have been reported as lost, stolen or otherwise 
unsuitable for use.” [http://www.gsmworld.com/using/
security/index.shtml]. MEND is a UK-based multipurpose 
service for tracking stolen property: “MEND is the UK’s 
largest database of property ownership and currently 
holds the records of millions of personal possessions and 
business assets and over 4.5 million items reported as lost 
and stolen.”[ https://www.menduk.org/] 
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United States (US)
 Market size (000s) and share for prepaid mobile phones
2001 2002 2003
11,565 (6.0%) 11,565 (8.2%) È 11,565 (7.3%) Í
Source: OECD (2005) Communication Outlook
The government of the United States does 
not require mobile phone operators to collect 
customer information when activating prepaid 
service accounts. However, there does appear to 
have been an effort to introduce regulations for 
prepaid communication services:
In early 200, a Pennsylvania state 
legislator introduced legislation that 
would have required stores to record 
the identity of everyone buying a 
phone card. The [International Prepaid 
Communication Association] was 
instrumental in killing that bill, but it may 
be symptomatic of the kind of legislation 
we may see in the future.6
Perhaps of greater concern to the prepaid telecom 
industry in the United States is possible scrutiny 
following from provisions in the Intelligence Act 
of 2004 to increase powers of authorities to 
obtain records from businesses “whose cash 
transactions have a high degree of usefulness in 
criminal, tax or regulatory matters.” It has been 
reported in the United States that prepaid phone 
cards were associated with terrorist activities, 
including the Oklahoma City bombings.64
In June 2004, the International Prepaid 
Communication Association (IPCA) announced 
that it would form a committee to look into call 
detail records (CDR) storage and develop a 
consensus position on anti-terrorism legislation 
that might affect the prepaid industry. IPCA has 
been encouraged by the FBI and DEA in the 
6  Harding, Richard A. (2004, May). “Terrorism’s impact.” 
Intele-Card News. Retrieved Sept. 29, 2004. Available http://
www.intelecard.com/ipcaview/0ipcaview.asp?A_ID=8 
64  ibid.
United States “to promote industry standards 
for CDR storage” and to provide expert advice on 
“call hopping,” which is described as
… a method of using one phonecard to 
call another phonecard switch, and use 
the second phonecard to call a third 
switch and then make the call to the 
desired destination. The multiple CDRs 
generated are difficult to trace and 
particularly difficult to trace expeditiously. 
… [and] it is impossible to tell whether a 
phonecard switch is carrying a call from 
another phonecard’s switch.65
One aim of the IPCA committee work was 
purported to be the creation of a centralized 
database of prepaid CDRs to support law 
enforcement activities in the United States, 
possibly as an alternative to a customer 
registration policy. An informal conversation with 
Regulatory Affairs department of the Cellular 
Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) 
indicated that law enforcement agencies in 
the United States routinely employ a range of 
methods, including so-called “trap and trace” to 
identify telephone users.
The prepaid industry has also noted problems 
with regulatory compliance more generally:
It is common knowledge in the prepaid 
phonecard industry that few laws applying 
to prepaid phonecard issuers are strictly 
enforced. … [W]hen a new phonecard 
law is passed, the common scenario is 
that the more legitimate companies will 
comply and bear the costs of the new 
rules. But, less legitimate companies 
will not comply and the result will be that 
they will have a competitive edge over 
the companies in conformance.66
65  Segermark, Howard. (2004, Oct. 8). “Prepaid call 
detail records: an anti-terrorism tool.” The Prepaid Press. 
Retrieved Oct, 2005. Available http://www.prepaid-press.
com/news_detail.php?t=paper&id=598 
66  ibid.
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It is not known, however, if any formal 
background studies have been undertaken in 
the United States specifically with respect to a 
registration policy for prepaid services. Similarly, 
no information has been obtained to provide 
an update on the IPCA committee’s work (or 
subsequent industry-led initiatives) to examine 
the use of call detail records to support law 
enforcement and national security activities in 
the United States.
The United States does not have a national 
Integrated Public Number Database for the 
express purpose of law enforcement or public 
safety.
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SUMMARY
The following sections present a summary of 
observations and findings from the survey.
Justification for and against prepaid registration
The justification in support of a prepaid 
registration requirement in most countries has 
been expressed in terms of improving efficiency 
for law enforcement and national security. 
One exception was Ireland, where the call for 
registration was concerned with the protection of 
minors from adult content on G networks. Other 
reasons given to support prepaid registration 
included support of emergency services, 
maintenance of commercial directory services 
and enabling local number portability, as well as 
for certain value-added services (e.g., location 
based services).
The justification against prepaid registration 
requirement has been expressed in terms of 
cost to business, privacy concerns in terms 
of unintended use and disclosure of customer 
records, and questions about the effectiveness 
of such a measure to deter or otherwise reduce 
criminal activity associated with prepaid phones.
Feasibility of implementing and enforcing regulatory 
measures
In most cases where prepaid registration has 
been introduced there has been little information 
forthcoming about how authorities intend to 
monitor and enforce compliance, aside from 
disconnecting unregistered customers. Two 
exceptions are in Australia and Norway where 
concerns about point of sale identity verification 
and validation has received considerable 
attention. In Australia the matter remains 
unresolved pending the outcome of a public 
consultation to consider alternative methods.
In some countries, customers are required to 
report to the mobile operators each transfer 
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of ownership or second-hand sale of a prepaid 
mobile phone. This may be especially problematic 
in countries where large numbers of mobile 
phones are bought and sold through informal 
distribution channels.
There is still some ambiguity as to how 
long mobile operators are required to retain 
information collected from prepaid customers and 
how to determine when a customer “terminates” 
their prepaid service. As well, there is some 
uncertainty as to the division of responsibility 
between mobile operators and customers with 
respect to upkeep of prepaid registration records 
and any related liability issues.
There was very little information from government 
authorities concerning the anticipated cost of 
the registration requirement to mobile operators 
or customers, or about the cost to government 
for monitoring and enforcing compliance. The UK 
Mobile Broadband Group estimates that the cost 
of a registration scheme would be £6 ($2.50 
CAD) per customer per annum.
Possible use of alternative measures
There was no indication to suggest that 
alternative measures for identifying prepaid 
users have been tested or adopted in any of 
the countries that responded to the survey. 
One notable exception to this is in Australia, 
where the regulator has proposed an electronic 
verification of customers during “post-sale” 
activation process rather than at the point of 
sale.
In the case of Germany and the Netherlands, 
there is some indication that IMSI-catcher 
technology has been used by law enforcement 
to identify mobile phone users. Further details 
are available but have not been translated into 
English (see country profile for Germany).
In the United States the prepaid communications 
lobby has suggested the standardization and 
centralization of prepaid Call Detail Recording 
(CDR) systems possibly to draw attention away 
from calls for a prepaid registration requirement.
Impact on IPND
Statements made by the Australian regulator 
in its July 2005 discussion paper, indicate that 
failure to validate and verify prepaid mobile 
phones will have a significant impact on the 
accuracy and usefulness of an Integrated Public 
Number Database.
A number of countries, such as Germany and the 
Netherlands, require that operators make their 
customer records available to law enforcement 
agencies, but none have reported having a 
standalone national IPND. Experience from 
Australia indicates that even with a registration 
requirement, customer records for mobile 
services and prepaid mobile services tend to 
have lower accuracy than records for landline 
customers.
Experience from Australia also suggests that 
a robust and efficient identity validation and 
verification system must be in place in order 
to ensure accurate record keeping and for the 
maintenance of an IPND system.
~ ~ ~
The purpose of this report has been to present 
information gathered about the regulation of 
prepaid mobile phone services across a range 
of countries comparable to Canada. Readers 
are reminded that the purpose of this report has 
not been an in-depth analysis of the findings 
but rather to provide a body of data with which 
to support public deliberation on the question 
of privacy rights and prepaid communications 
services in Canada and elsewhere.
It is hoped that the information presented in 
this report will assist other researchers and 
policymakers to undertake in-depth analysis 
and investigation into specific details when and 
where it is seen to be fit to do so.
  Annex A •  59 
Annex A: Survey Instrument
PART A: All respondents are asked to complete 
this section
The regulation of prepaid mobile phone service 
or SIM cards in your country.
A Does the government of your country require 
the identification of users of prepaid mobile 
phones or mobile phone SIM cards?
A2 Can you provide source information for 
any government documents or public 
policy statements in connection with the 
introduction of these requirements? 
  If so, please indicate the approximate 
date and source of this statement or 
statements:
A Has your government sought or otherwise 
received expert or public opinion concerning 
the introduction of identity requirements for 
prepaid mobile phone service, whether or 
not these requirements are now in force?
  If so, please indicate the approximate 
date of this consultation and the source of 
any public documents about it.
A4 Has your government sought opinion on 
alternative means for identifying mobile 
phone customers that do not depend on the 
collection of subscriber information at the 
point of sale?
  If so, please indicate the approximate 
date of this consultation and the source of 
any public documents about it.
A5 Does your government produce or make 
available a report on law enforcement or 
national security activities that might include 
information about prepaid mobile phone 
users?
  If so, please indicate as much source 
information (date, title, etc) as possible 
about this report.
PART B: Please answer this section if your country 
has an identity requirement or will soon introduce 
an identity requirement for prepaid mobile phone 
service.
B Can you provide information about any 
background studies produced by any 
organization (public or private) within your 
country that explicitly support an identity 
requirement for prepaid mobile phone 
service?
  If so, please indicate as much source 
information (date, organization, title, etc) as 
possible about these studies.
B2 What organization(s) is/are designated to 
administer the identity requirements for 
prepaid mobile phones in your country?
B Does this organization produce a 
regular report on compliance with these 
regulations?
B4 Is this report available to the public?
  If so, please indicate as much source 
information (date, title, etc) as possible 
about this report.
B5 Has this organization ever taken action to 
enforce compliance? 
  Please indicate any specific details of 
this action
PART C: All respondents are requested to answer 
the questions in this section.
C Can you provide information about any 
background studies produced by any 
organization (public or private) within your 
country that have explicitly opposed an 
identity requirement for prepaid mobile 
phone service?
  If so, please indicate as much source 
information (date, organization, title, etc) as 
possible about these studies.
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C2 Do any mobile phone operators in your 
country publish a corporate policy regarding 
the collection of customer information from 
prepaid mobile phone subscribers? 
  If so, please indicate as much source 
information as possible about these 
corporate policies.
C Have the mobile phone operators or retailers 
in your country published an industry-wide 
code of practice regarding the collection off 
customer information from prepaid mobile 
phone subscribers?
  If so, please indicate as much source 
information as possible about this code of 
practice (e.g., organization, website, press 
releases, etc.)
PART D: All respondents are requested to answer 
the questions in this section.
D Does your country maintain an ‘integrated 
public number database’ containing 
the details of all telephone subscriber 
information for the purpose of public safety 
or law enforcement?
  If so, please indicate as much 
source information as possible about 
the organization designated to operate 
this database, as well as the year it was 
introduced into service.
D2 Does the database administrator issue a 
regular report concerning the use of the 
database in your country?
  If so, please indicate as much source 
information (date, title, etc.) as possible 
about this report.
D Does the database administrator apply 
any form of measurement concerning the 
usefulness of the integrated public number 
database for law enforcement or public 
safety purposes?
  If so, please describe these 
measurements.
D4 Does the database administrator or any 
other organization apply any form of cost/
benefit measure concerning the database in 
your country? 
  If so, please indicate as much as 
possible about this measure.
PART E: All respondents are requested to respond 
to the questions in this section.
E Do you have any additional comments or 
further information you wish to add to this 
survey?
E2 Please fill in your contact information below 
to validate the survey. We will keep these 
details confidential at your request (see 
question E).
E Do you want us to keep your name and other 
contact information confidential when we 
publish the results of this survey?
E4 May we contact you if we have additional 
follow-up questions from this survey?
E5 Do you wish to receive the results of the 
report when they become available?
End of survey
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Annex B: Summary of Responses to the Survey
The following table provides a raw summary of survey responses. Readers should note that the information 
contained in the country profiles section of the report differ slightly from details contained in this table. This 
is due in some cases to differences in the interpretation of the questions. In other cases, additional follow 
up research led the research team to findings that affected the interpretation of the initial responses.
Country code Part A Part B Part C Part D Part E
Australia AU Yes identification 
requirement  in 
1997 Telecoms 
Act; it applies 
to all fixed and 
mobile services; 
not known if gov’t  
sought opinion 
when introducing 
requirements but 
press release 
issued at time of 
introduction of 
requirement; no 
opinion sought on 
alternative means; 
yes government  
reports on lawful 
access activities 
(see Part D);
Yes background 
studies might be 
found in public 
debates leading 
to 1997 Telecoms 
Act; each carrier 
administers identity 
requirements; yes 
report(s) are issued 
on compliance[?]; 
uncertain if report 
is available to 
public but ACMA 
manages many 
compliance 
functions and 
issues annual 
report; yes action 
taken to enforce 
compliance (no 
details); 
No studies 
opposed to identity 
requirement; yes 
most operators 
publish a corporate 
policy about 
identity collection 
according to privacy 
legislation (e.g., 
Telstra website); 
no industry-wide 
code of practice 
as presence of  
legislation negates 
any  need for it;
Yes there has been 
an IPND since 
1998, operated by 
Telstra on behalf 
of industry;  it is 
subject to annual 
audit until 2006; 
fact sheet available 
on ACMA website; 
no report issued 
by Telstra but 
ACMA includes it 
in annual report; 
no  measure of 
usefulness applied 
to IPND; no cost/
benefit measure 
applied;
Response provided 
by industry 
executive;
Austria AT No identification 
requirement;
-- -- -- No formal 
response;
Belgium BE No identification 
requirement; no 
public statements; 
not known if 
opinion sought on 
introduction of such 
requirements; no 
opinion sought on 
alternative means; 
no report issued 
about lawful access 
activities;
Not applicable No background 
studies that 
oppose identity 
requirements; no 
mobile operators 
publish corporate 
policy on identity 
collection from 
prepaid; no 
industry-wide 
code of practice 
published;
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities;
Response provided 
by industry 
executive;
Canada CA No identification 
requirement
Not applicable No background 
studies that 
oppose identity 
requirements but 
public statements 
made by Privacy 
Commissioner, civil 
society, and mobile 
carriers; no industry 
code of practice 
published;
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities
Response provided 
by university 
researcher;
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Country code Part A Part B Part C Part D Part E
Czech Republic CZ No identification 
requirement; yes 
opinion sought 
through discussions 
held in Parliament 
in May 2005; 
not known if 
opinion sought on 
alternative means; 
no report made 
available about 
lawful access 
activities;
Not applicable Not known if any 
studies opposed 
to identity 
requirement; 
however, some 
discussion reported 
between Czech 
regulator and 
Mobile Network 
Operators 
Association with 
no reported 
outcome; yes 
mobile operators 
obliged to publish 
corporate policy 
on general terms 
and conditions 
of service, under 
which prepaid 
registration is 
voluntary; no 
industry-wide code 
of practice has 
been published;
No IPND for law 
enforcement but 
incumbent operator 
maintains a public 
directory that does 
include mobile 
phone numbers of 
subscribers who 
have requested 
their publication ; 
Response provided 
by industry 
executive;
Denmark DK No identification 
requirement; no 
public statements; 
no opinion sought 
on introduction 
of identity 
requirements; no 
opinion sought on 
alternative means; 
no report issued 
on lawful access 
activities;
Not applicable Not known if any 
studies opposed 
to identity 
requirement; 
not known if 
mobile operators 
publish corporate 
policy on identity 
requirements; not 
known if industry-
wide code of 
practice has been 
published;
No IPND; however 
operators are 
obliged by law to 
operate their own 
customer number 
databases [not 
known if prepaid 
is included]; not 
known if report 
is issued about 
the use of these 
databases or their 
value to lawful 
access
Response provided 
by university 
researcher
Finland FI No response -- -- -- --
France FR Yes identification 
requirement to 
fulfil statutory 
requirements for 
lawful access and 
formally requested 
by Ministry of 
Interior in 1997; 
not known if 
opinions sought 
when introducing 
requirements; no 
opinion sought on 
alternative means; 
not known if report 
issued on lawful 
access activities;
No studies 
that explicitly 
support identity 
requirement; 
each operator 
administers 
own identity 
requirements; 
no report issued 
on compliance; 
no action taken 
to enforce 
compliance;
No information 
provided about 
background studies 
that oppose identity 
requirements; not 
known if mobile 
operators publish 
corporate policy on 
identity collection 
[?]; no industry-
wide code of 
practice has been 
published;
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities;
Response provided 
by industry 
executive;
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Country code Part A Part B Part C Part D Part E
Germany DE Yes identification 
requirement 
established in 
Telecoms Act, sec. 
111 dated 22 June 
2004; not known 
if opinions sought 
when introducing 
requirements; 
not known if 
opinion sought on 
alternative means; 
however, IMSI-
catcher has been 
used and is allowed 
by legislation; 
no report made 
available on lawful 
access activities;
No studies 
that explicitly 
support identity 
requirement; 
however, some 
related research 
on telecom 
surveillance has 
been published; 
regulator (BNetzA) 
is responsible 
for securing 
compliance; no 
report issued 
on compliance; 
however, reports 
might appear in 
future given that 
requirements 
introduced recently 
in 2004; not 
known if action 
taken to enforce 
compliance;
Yes information 
provided about 
background studies 
that oppose identity 
requirements 
[?]; however, a 
complaint was 
recently issued to 
German Federal 
Constitution Court 
(20 June 2005) 
challenging the 
new Telecoms Act, 
including identity 
requirement for 
prepaid;  not 
known if mobile 
operators publish 
corporate policy on 
identity collection; 
not known if 
industry-wide code 
of practice has 
been published;
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities;
Response provided 
by university 
researcher;
Greece GR No identification 
requirement; 
yes policy 
statement from 
the government 
protect anonymous 
prepaid usage; 
no opinion sought 
on alternative 
means, however, 
the Hellenic Data 
Protection Authority 
drew attention to 
the issue; no report 
on lawful access 
activities.
Not applicable. Yes information 
provided about 
background studies 
that oppose identity 
requirements (Law 
2774/1999); no 
mobile operators 
publish corporate 
policy on identity 
collection; no 
industry wide code 
of practice exists.
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities;
Response provided 
by government 
official;
Hungary HU Yes identification 
requirement; yes 
policy statement 
from government 
under Act No. C of 
2003 on Electric 
Communication; 
not known if 
opinion sought on 
alternative means; 
not known if report 
issued on lawful 
access activities.
Not known if 
studies done to 
support identity 
requirement; not 
known if reports 
on compliance; 
not known if 
compliance 
enforced.
Not known 
if studies 
opposed identity 
requirements; yes 
mobile operators 
publish corporate 
policy on identity 
collection; no 
industry wide code 
of practice needed, 
as appropriate 
legislation exists.
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities;
Response provided 
by government 
official;
Iceland IS No response -- -- -- --
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Country code Part A Part B Part C Part D Part E
Ireland IE No identification 
requirement; 
however, the 
government sought 
to build a national 
register  of 3G 
phones in 2003-
04; not known if 
opinions sought 
on introduction 
of identity 
requirements; no 
opinion sought on 
alternative means; 
no report issued 
on lawful access 
activities; 
Not applicable Not known if any 
studies opposed 
to identity 
requirements; 
however, mobile 
industry lobbied 
against proposed 
prepaid registration 
[?]; yes operators 
publish corporate 
policy on identity 
collection in 
accordance with 
privacy legislation; 
moreover, voluntary 
registration 
for prepaid is 
encouraged by 
operators, some 
of whom offer 
call credit [B2]; 
yes industry-wide 
code of practice 
published in 2004 
to promote safe 
and responsible 
use of prepaid 
mobile phones, and 
to allow parents to 
access children’s 
prepaid records 
and account 
details;
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities;
Response provided 
by industry 
executive;
Italy IT Yes (unconfirmed 
report);
-- -- -- --
Japan JP Yes identification 
requirement 
established in 
Law #31 - on 
confirmation 
of personal 
identification of 
the subscribers, 
effective April 
2005; yes 
opinion sought 
through hearings 
with operators 
and consumer 
representatives; no 
opinion sought on 
alternative means; 
no report issued 
on lawful access 
activities.
No studies 
done that 
support identity 
requirement; 
regulator (MIC) 
and police 
(NPA) administer 
the identity 
requirements; 
no reports on 
compliance; yes 
action taken to 
enforce compliance 
in form of criminal 
charges, as well as 
PR campaigns.
No background 
studies that 
oppose identity 
requirements; no 
corporate policy 
published, but 
operators announce 
activities that 
comply with law; no 
industry-wide code 
of practice.
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities
Response provided 
by industry 
executive;
Korea KR No response -- -- -- --
Luxembourg LE No response -- -- -- --
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Mexico MX No identification 
requirement; not 
known if expert 
opinion sought 
the introduction 
of requirements; 
not known if 
opinion sought on 
alternative means; 
no report issued 
on lawful access 
activities.
Not applicable; No background 
studies opposing 
identity 
requirements; no 
mobile operators 
publish corporate 
policy; no industry 
wide corporate 
policy established
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities;
Response provided 
by civil society 
organization;
Netherlands NL No identification 
requirement; yes 
expert opinion 
sought when 
considering 
requirements; yes 
alternative means 
of identifying 
phone numbers 
was demonstrated 
without registration; 
no report issued 
on lawful access 
activities
Not applicable; Not known if 
background studies 
were published that 
oppose identity 
requirements; yes 
mobile operators 
publish corporate 
privacy policy, 
service incentives 
for supplying 
identification 
information are 
provided, details 
used for direct 
marketing; no 
industry-wide code 
of practice exists.
No IPND, however, 
mobile operators 
submit subscriber 
information to 
a database that 
operates like an 
IPND and can only 
be accessed by 
law enforcement 
agencies through 
a third party under 
authority of the 
Ministry of Justice; 
yes the third party 
issues a report 
concerning use of 
database; don’t 
know if the value 
of the database is 
assessed.
Response provided 
by industry 
executive;
New Zealand NZ No identification 
requirement; no 
opinion sought 
on possibility of 
requirements; no 
opinion sought 
on alternative 
means, however, 
the identification 
of mobile phone 
activity in prisons is 
being investigated; 
no report on lawful 
access activities.
Not applicable; No background 
studies opposing 
identity 
requirements 
published; no 
operators publish 
corporate policy on 
identity collection; 
no industry-wide 
code of practice.
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities.
Response provided 
by industry 
executive;
Norway NO Yes identification 
requirement 
established 
in Electronic 
Communications 
Act and related 
committee reports 
between 2001-
2003; yes opinion 
sought through 
public hearing 
process; no 
opinion sought on 
alternative means; 
yes report issued 
on lawful access 
activities; 
Not known if 
studies done that 
support identity 
requirement; 
regulator (NPT) 
administers 
the identity 
requirements; 
yes reports on 
compliance;  yes 
report available to 
public (included in 
regulator’s annual 
reports); yes action 
taken to enforce 
compliance in the 
form of letters sent 
to operators by 
regulator;
No information 
provided about 
background studies 
that oppose identity 
requirements; 
not known if 
operators publish 
corporate policy on 
identity collection; 
however, Telenor 
has information 
about registration 
procedures on 
website;   no 
industry-wide 
code of practice 
published;
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities;
Response provided 
by university 
researcher;
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Poland PL No identification 
requirement; no 
statement issued, 
however, the 
registration of 
prepaid phones to 
prevent terrorism 
and crime was 
proposed by 
the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and 
Administration, 
Internal Security 
Agency and 
Ministry of National 
Defense; No 
opinion sought 
on registration; 
not known if 
opinion sought on 
alternatives; not 
known if report 
issued on lawful 
access activities.
Not applicable; Not known if 
background 
studies produced 
opposing identity 
requirements, 
however, mobile 
phone operators 
opposed 
registration 
measures due to 
the financial costs 
they would incur; 
yes mobile phone 
operators publish 
corporate policy on 
identity collection; 
no industry wide 
code of practice.
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities.
Response provided 
by government 
official;
Portugal PT No identification 
requirement; no 
statement issued; 
don’t know if 
opinion sought 
when introducing 
requirements; 
don’t know if 
opinion sought on 
alternative means; 
no report issued 
on lawful access 
activities.
Not applicable. No background 
studies that 
oppose identity 
requirements; 
no mobile 
operators publish 
corporate policy 
on registration; no 
industry-wide code 
of practice.
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities.
Response provided 
by industry 
executive;
Slovak Republic SK Yes identification 
requirement 
regulations 
explained in Act 
610 of 2003; 
not known if 
opinions sought 
on implementing 
requirements; no 
opinion sought on 
alternative means 
of identification; 
not known if report 
on lawful access is 
published.
Not known if 
background studies 
support identity 
requirement; 
each operator 
collects and retains 
identification 
information; not 
known if reports 
on compliance 
published; yes 
compliance has 
been enforced by 
law enforcement 
requests, and is 
subject to fines by 
Telecommunications 
Office.
Not known if 
background studies 
published that 
oppose identity 
requirements; yes 
operators publish 
corporate privacy 
policy; no industry-
wide code of 
practice is needed 
as appropriate 
legislation exists.
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities.
Response provided 
by government 
official;
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South Africa 
(non-OECD)
-- Yes identification 
requirement 
established in 
Act 70 of 2002, 
but will only be 
implemented at 
the end of 2005, 
however, the 
proposed paper-
based collection 
system may be 
supplanted by 
an electronic 
registration 
process, due 
to extensive 
use of informal 
distribution 
channels; yes 
public opinion 
sought during 
legislative process; 
no opinion sought 
on alternative 
means; no report 
on lawful access 
activities.
No background 
studies supporting 
identity 
requirement 
published; each 
operator collects 
and retains 
identification 
information; 
no reports on 
compliance; no 
action taken 
to enforce 
compliance, 
however, severe 
penalties are 
enabled in the act 
for non-compliance.
No background 
studies published 
that oppose identity 
requirement; yes 
operators publish 
corporate privacy 
policy; no industry-
wide code of 
practice.
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities.
Response provided 
by industry 
executive;
Spain ES No identification 
requirement; yes 
statement issued 
in 2002/2003 
by a previous 
government on 
desire to mandate 
identification of 
prepaid customers; 
not known if 
opinions sought 
on possibility of 
requirements; no 
opinions sought on 
alternative means; 
no report on lawful 
access activities.
Not applicable; No background 
studies opposing 
identity 
requirements 
published; not 
known if operators 
public corporate 
policy on identity 
requirements; no 
industry-wide code 
of practice.
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities.
Response provided 
by industry 
executive;
Sweden SE No identification 
requirement; 
no statement 
issued; an enquiry 
into introducing 
requirements has 
not resulted in 
regulations; not 
known if opinion 
sought on alternative 
means; every year 
the government 
issues a report 
to the Parliament 
on privacy and 
telecommunications; 
no report issued 
on lawful access 
activities; 
Not applicable Not known if 
background studies 
opposing identity 
requirements 
published; yes 
mobile operators 
publish corporate 
policy on identity 
collection; however, 
details may be 
vague; no industry-
wide code of 
practice for identity 
collection; 
Yes there is a 
public safety 
database  
operated by 
public institutions 
(SOS Alarm); yes 
administrator 
publishes a report 
concerning use 
of the database; 
however, this may 
be confined to 
financial reporting; 
not known if any 
measures applied 
to assess the value 
of the database;
Response provided 
by university 
researcher;
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Switzerland CH Yes identification 
requirement 
announced in 
government press 
release of 23 June 
2004; not known 
if opinion sought 
when introducing 
requirements 
(see Part C); no 
opinion sought on 
alternative means; 
no report made 
available on lawful 
access activities;
No information 
provided about 
background 
studies that 
support the identity 
requirement; 
each carrier 
administers identity 
requirements; 
no reports on 
compliance; report 
s are not available 
to public; no 
reported action 
taken to enforce 
compliance;
No information 
provided about 
background studies 
that oppose identity 
requirements; 
however, 
parliamentary 
record indicates 
a  commission 
asked to study 
the question 
recommended 
against it; yes 
mobile operators 
publish corporate 
policy on identity 
collection; no 
industry-wide code 
of practice has 
been published
No IPND or related 
administrative 
activities;
Response provided 
by industry 
executive;
Turkey TR No response -- -- -- --
United Kingdom UK No identification 
requirement; no 
opinion sought 
on introducing 
requirements; no 
opinion sought on 
alternative means; 
yes report issued 
by Interception 
Commissioner to 
Parliament (might 
include prepaid 
cases);
Not applicable Not known if 
any studies that 
oppose identity 
requirement; yes 
some mobile 
operators 
encourage 
voluntary 
registration but 
have an internal 
policy that does not 
support compulsory 
registration; 
however, Orange 
is reported to have 
a corporate policy 
of compulsory 
registration 
of prepaid for 
commercial 
reasons; no 
industry-wide 
code of practice in 
identity collection; 
however, Mobile 
Broadband 
Group opposes 
compulsory 
registration;
No IPND; however, 
CEIR and MEND 
(“the Register”) 
are databases 
maintained for 
tracing stolen 
equipment;
Response provided 
by industry 
executive
United States US No identification 
requirement; no 
opinion sought on 
the introduction 
of registration; no 
opinion sought on 
alternative means; 
not known if report 
issued on legal 
access activities.
Not applicable No background 
studies opposing 
identity 
requirements; not 
known if mobile 
operators publish 
corporate policy; 
yes a voluntary 
industry-wide code 
of practice exists.
No IPND; however, 
a nation-wide 
public numbers 
directory for 
landlines is 
established.
Response provided 
by civil society 
organization;
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Annex C: Vodafone Japan Customer Notification
Notice 
4 April 2005 
Vodafone K.K. to confirm identification of prepaid customers 
Vodafone K.K. announces today that it will introduce an additional measure on 25 April 2005 to confirm the 
identification of all customers using prepaid handsets sold under the Vodafone Prepaid Service* to prevent the 
inappropriate use of prepaid handsets in Japan. 
A change will be implemented to confirm the identity of all prepaid customers, including existing customers that 
purchased prepaid handsets in the past. Those unable to provide the requested information within a certain period 
will have their lines suspended. 
 
Details of the measure are as follows: 
()  Via its website, mail and other communication methods, Vodafone K.K. will request that prepaid customers 
register their ID information. The following types of customers are affected: 
 - Customers who are currently using prepaid handsets, but did not register ID information 
 - Customers who registered ID information but have since seen a change in registration details
 Customers who register ID information with Vodafone K.K. will be treated as Vodafone K.K. subscribers. 
Customers who registered ID information at time of purchase, but have since transferred prepaid mobile 
handsets to third parties, and are not using them, are required to report this information to Vodafone K.K. 
(2)  Customers will be able to register their ID information at Vodafone shops nationwide from 25 April until  
October 2005. 
()  From November 2005, Vodafone K.K. will begin suspending the lines of customers unable to provide ID 
information within the given timeframe above. 
In addition to implementing this measure to confirm the ID of prepaid customers, Vodafone K.K. will introduce a 
transfer system for its prepaid service to manage customer information. Customers wishing to transfer a prepaid 
handset to third parties will be required to report this information to Vodafone K.K. 
Vodafone K.K. has already implemented the following measures for prepaid service ID confirmation: 
()  Since December 2004, at time of purchase, customers can only use prepaid handsets after their ID 
information has been confirmed and registered on Vodafone K.K.’s customer information system. 
(2)  Since December 2004, Vodafone K.K. has been confirming the ID of existing prepaid customers  when 
requested by municipal governments, and has suspended lines if customers failed to provide the information 
requested. 
 
*Vodafone Prepaid Service and Pj. Pj is a prepaid service that offers handsets mainly in the Tokai region. 
-  Vodafone Prepaid Service and Pj are trademarks of Vodafone K.K. 
-  Vodafone is a registered trademark of Vodafone Group Plc. 
-  Vodafone Group is the world’s leading mobile carrier and as of the end of December 2004, had equity 
interests in 26 countries and 46.4m venture customers, with a further fourteen partner networks. 
About Vodafone K.K. 
Vodafone K.K. is a leading mobile operator in Japan with over 5 million customers and a subsidiary of Vodafone Group 
Plc, the world’s largest mobile community. The Tokyo-based company offers a wide range of sophisticated mobile 
voice and data services including Vodafone live!, which provides mail and internet access to 85% of its customers, 
and pioneered the picture messaging service called Sha-mail first introduced in November 2000. In December 2002, 
Vodafone K.K. launched the world’s first commercial G W-CDMA service based on GPP international standards. 
Vodafone K.K.’s G service offers its customers rich content and roaming on 55 networks in 6 countries and 
regions as of  March 2005. For more information, please visit www.vodafone.jp 
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Annex D: Translation of NPT Letter of 29 September 2004 
Providers of public mobile phone services  Our ref:   Our date:
as per attached address list     04/006-4.2 29.09.2004
       Your ref:  Your date:
       Executive Officer: 
       Einar Meling
       E-mail: 
einar.meling@npt.no
Registration of end-users, particularly with regard to pay-as-you go customers
The (Norwegian) Post and Telecommunications Authority (PT) refers to previous correspondence in this 
matter and to the meeting which took place at the offices of PT on 25 August 2004 between representatives 
from the providers, the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation & Prosecution of Economic and 
Environmental Crime (Økokrim), The Norwegian National Police Directorate (Politidirektoratet), Oslo Police 
District and PT.
Paragraph 6-2 of the Electronic Communication Networks and Electronic Communication Services 
regulation (referred to as the “Ekom regulation”), states that providers of public telephone services are 
obliged to keep a register of every end-user’s name, address and the number/address of the service. The 
register must contain information which enables the registered users to be unambiguously identified. 
Based on information it has received, the Post and Telecommunications Authority considers it necessary 
both to clarify what this registration requirement involves, and to guarantee its harmonised implementation. 
Below is a clarification of the requirements set by PT for the implementation of the registration of pay-as-
you go customers in accordance with paragraph 6-2 of the Ekom regulation.
1. Requirements for the information
The registration of end-users which the providers of public telephone services are obliged to carry out 
must contain information which makes unambiguous identification of the registered users possible. The 
stipulation refers to section 2 of paragraph 6- in the Ekom regulation, which gives examples of the type 
of information which makes unambiguous identification possible.
PT takes the view that the registration requirement is met as long as the registered information collectively 
makes it possible to identify the end-user in an unambiguous way. This means that there is no absolute 
demand for a personal identification number (equiv. to National Insurance Number). The end-user’s name, 
date of birth and address will in nearly all cases be sufficient to identify a particular person. When 
registering customers who are foreign nationals, their nationality will have to be noted in addition to their 
name, address and date of birth.
If the providers nevertheless should have a just requirement for collecting an end-user’s personal 
identification number in order to be able to provide unambiguous identification, this information must be 
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treated in accordance with the (Norwegian) Personal Data Act (Personopplysningsloven). In cases where 
obtaining a person’s personal identification number is regarded as necessary, PT considers that the 
rationale laid down in the regulation is sufficiently accommodated because such information is available 
at the time of registration. In PT’s view, subsequent retention of such information is not necessary to fulfil 
the requirement for registration according to paragraph 6-2 of the Ekom regulations.
Companies wishing to give their employees pay-as-you-go subscriptions will have to register such 
subscriptions to a responsible person and with the same requirements for personal information as with 
registration of private customers.
2. Quality assurance of information
The requirement that the information must make unambiguous identification possible means that the 
information registered at the time of registration needs to be of a certain quality. 
So far, quality checks of information have been carried out by the providers by comparing the information 
they are given with information in the national population register (Folkeregisteret). However, the Authority 
for Investigation & Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (Økokrim) and the police want stricter 
identity control based on the Money Laundering Act (Hvitvaskingsloven), which means that customers have 
to provide identification before a relationship with the provider can be established. The providers feel that 
this will be difficult to carry out in practice and too strict requirements will have negative consequences for 
the sale of pay-as-you-go cards.
Beyond the demand for unambiguous identification, the Act on Electronic Communication (Ekomloven) and 
the Ekom-regulation do not give any clear leads on the type of quality assurance required for information. 
Paragraph 5 of the Money Laundering Act, however, states clearly that identity checks must be done face 
to face. The above-mentioned laws thus have a very different basis, and for that reason PT doubts whether 
the Money Laundering Act can be used as a model for interpreting the law and regulations on electronic 
communication. PT thus finds it difficult to set an absolute demand that customers must provide ID when 
they buy pay-as-you-go cards. This also needs to be seen in the light of the many different places which 
sell top up cards. 
A minimum requirement for quality assurance is, however, that the registered information is checked 
against information in the national population register (Folkeregisteret). Applications for on-line permission 
or other permission can be sent to the Central Office for Population Registration (Sentralkontoret for 
Folkeregistrering). As an equivalent check for customers who are foreign nationals would not be possible, 
PT will at a later stage give further consideration to the registration of these customers if there proves to 
be a large number of false registrations in this group.
3. Time of registration
One of the main considerations behind the requirement for registration is that it needs to be possible to 
trace the owner of a telephone subscription for (criminal) investigation purposes. It is therefore of critical 
importance that when taking out a new subscription, the customer should not be able to use the telephone 
until the registration is complete.
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In order for the registration to comply with paragraph 6-2 in the Ekom-regulations, providers must thus 
make sure that necessary information is registered and quality assured before the SIMcard of the mobile 
phone can be activated. This could for example happen by on-line registration at the point of sale, or by 
making the very first telephone call to customer service. 
4. Closing dates for the registration of end-users
The following closing dates for registration duty will apply:
• All new pay-as-you-go customers must be registered in accordance with the above by  January 
2005. From the same date it will no longer be possible for unregistered pay-as-you-go customers 
to top up their cards.
• All end-users must be registered in accordance with the above by  June 2005.
From that same date, unregistered user-numbers or numbers where the registration 
clearly is false, will be closed to traffic.
Any objections to these time limits must be sent to PT by  October 2004.
 
Yours faithfully
Willy Jensen   Arne Litleré
      
cc.:  Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications (Samferdselsdepartementet)
Espen Skjerven, Norwegian National Authority for Investigation & 
Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (Økokrim) 
Leif A. Halvorsen, Oslo Police 
Annicken Iversen, The National Police Directorate (Politidirektoratet) 
Norwegian Data Inspectorate (Datatilsynet)
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Annex E: Translation of NPT Letter of 8 November 2004
Providers of public mobile phone services  Our ref:   Our date:
as per attached address list     04/00631-411.2 08.11.2004
       Your ref:  Your date:
       Executive Officer: 
       Einar Meling
       E-mail: 
einar.meling@npt.no
Registration of end-users, particularly with regard to pay-as-you go customers
We (The Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority (PT)) refer to our letter dated 29 September 
2004. In this letter, we outlined the requirements we wanted established in connection with information, 
quality assurance of information and time of registration, particularly with regard to pay-as-you go 
customers. PT further established time limits for the registration of end-users in accordance with the 
requirements, but giving providers the opportunity to raise objections to the time limits. The demand for 
registration covers all providers of public telephone services, but is mainly relevant for providers with pay-
as-you-go customers in this context.
NetCom and Sense have raised objections to the requirements. The companies particularly point to the 
requirement that a mobile phone would not be enabled for use until the user has been unambiguously 
identified. The companies feel that in order to be able to meet this requirement a 24-hour customer service 
centre will have to be established, and this would be both expensive and time-consuming. The companies 
therefore propose that it should still be possible to use the telephone for a limited period before the user 
is unambiguously identified. 
PT cannot agree to this request. We feel that such an arrangement would undermine the aim of paragraph 
6-2 of the Ekom regulations. The reactions to our letter of 29 September 2004, however, appear to show 
that it was interpreted to mean that providers are locked into just one way of meeting this requirement. PT 
would therefore like to emphasise the following:
The main requirement is that public telephone services should not be enabled for use until the user/
owner has been registered in an unambiguous way. It is the providers of such services who are 
responsible for fulfilling this requirement. 
The requirement appears to be satisfactorily met as far as subscription customers are concerned, both for 
landlines and mobiles, but not for pay-as-you-go customers. For pay-as-you-go customers the requirement 
could be met e.g. by the customer providing identification at the point of sale. In such cases the customer 
would be able to use the mobile phone immediately after the seller has registered the customer’s name 
and address in line with the identification provided. The provision of ID at the point of sale would also 
guarantee unambiguous identification of persons who are not registered in the National Population 
Register (Folkeregisteret). The providers can also use other methods with regard to establishing customers’ 
identity, as long as the above-mentioned main requirements are met. However, as far as foreign nationals 
temporarily staying in Norway are concerned, it is difficult to envisage any other method than the provision 
of ID to guarantee unambiguous identification. 
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For the sake of good order, PT would like to remind providers that they also have a responsibility to ensure 
that the information they hold on existing customers is correct in relation to the demand for unambiguous 
identification. PT has legal authority to set further demands pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 0-6 
of the Ekom Act if we learn of false registrations.
NetCom and Sense also request that PT postpone the deadlines for the introduction of the registration 
requirement. PT is able to postpone the deadlines as follows:
• All new end-users of public telephone services, including pay-as-you-go customers, must be 
registered in accordance with the requirements by  February 2005. From that same date, 
unregistered pay-as-you-go customers will no longer be able to top up their mobile cash cards.
• In accordance with the requirements, all end-users of public telephone services must be registered 
by  August 2005. From that date, numbers where a user is not unambiguously registered will be 
closed to normal traffic.
PT presupposes that providers will adequately inform their customers in relation to the implementation of 
these requirements, including contractual matters connected to any closure of traffic to numbers where 
the customer has a credit typical of pay-as-you-go cards. 
Yours faithfully
Willy Jensen        Torstein Olsen
cc.:  Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications (Samferdselsdepartementet)
Norwegian National Authority for Investigation & 
Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (Økokrim) 
Oslo Police District, Organised Crime
The National Police Directorate (Politidirektoratet) 
  Annex F •  75 
Annex F: Swisscom Customer Notification
 76 • Annex G
Annex g: Swisscom Customer Registration Form


